Valparaiso University

ValpoScholar
The Cresset (archived issues)
12-1986

The Cresset (Vol. L, No 2)
Valparaiso University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/cresset_archive
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
The Cresset (archived issues) by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please
contact a ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu.

• Faith and Learning in the Christian University
• On Realism: Morgenthau, Kennan, Niebuhr, & Voegelin
• Robert Benne on Mutual Love and Christian Love

A review of literature, the Arts, and Public Affairs
-~-~·""-

Dec~~mber,

(..~~-··-_:.·./!,Jl

,__

1986

.
,•,

CRESSET
ROBERT V. SCHNABEL, Publisher
JAMES NUECHTERLEIN, Editor

Valparaiso University
Valparaiso, Indiana 46383

DECEMBER, 1986 Vol. L, No. 2
ISSN 0011-1198

Contributors
3
4

5
8
9

17
21
22
23
25
26
30
31
32

The Editor I IN LUCE TUA
Eric Potter I DAY'S END (Verse)
Robert Benne I MUTUAL LOVE AND CHRISTIAN LOVE
Bernhard Hillila I IT'S A BOY! (Verse)
James Nuechterlein I FAITH AND LEARNING IN THE CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY
Glenn N. Schram I REALISM RECONSIDERED
R. L. Barth I CHRISTMAS DAY 1779; HOPE; WASTING TIME (Verse)
Richard Lee I THE CHRISTMAS CAROLS
Linda Ferguson I SOCRATIC METHOD & MUSIC PERFORMANCE
Lois Reiner I AMEN (Verse)
Albert R. Trost I HARD CHOICES
Warren Rubel I A GRAVE GRACE
Pat James I THE NOTE (Verse)
Dot Nuechterlein I WOE TO YOU, DEAR DOCTORS

Departmental Editors
Jill Baumgaertner, Poetry Editor
Richard H. Vj. Brauer,. Art Editor
Dorothy. C~otrp.a;;~; n~:·"Edjtor
~

. ..

.·.:. ..

.··.:.·.·.·.

AdV.~ory Board
:_.: .•
Ja~·;i 4tt~~ •
Frederick N~(dner

Rjc;b~rd·fi~~~::: :~~el :P~hl . ::. •.
Jci!Vt:is Car18ti •• • •• • "M~·~"w~fi~
Al.f~ Met~r:: _.:~ :: ~tl\'":v..'ien qtfll6i
:.

. . . .. . .
.....·:.
.. .. .... .· ....·
....·.·. .Managers .~.....
Busmess
.···
·~

Wilbu~· of(;• Hutchins, R~(~:.:

Betty Wagner, Administf~ti~~ and Circulation
THE CRESSET is published monthly during the academic year,
September through May, by the Valparaiso University Press as a
forum for ideas and informed opinion. The views expressed are
those of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the preponderance of opinion at Valparaiso University. Manuscripts should be
addressed to the Editor and accompanied by return postage. Letters to the Editor for publication are subject to editing for brevity. The Book Review Index and the American Humanities Index list
Cresset reviews. Second class postage paid at Valparaiso, Indiana.
Regular subscription rates: one year-$8.50; two years-$14.75;
single copy-$1.25. Student subscription rates: one year-$4.00;
single copy-$.75. Entire contents copyrighted 1986 by the Valparaiso University Press, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383, without
whose written permission reproduction in whole or in part for
any purpose whatsoever is expressly forbidden.

2

Cover and above: Weaving and sculpture are
among the various art forms which the residents of
Bethel, Bielefeld, West Germany, use as essential
elements of therapy to help themselves become
aware of their abilities to do useful and creative
work with their hands.
Over 7000 people live and work together at Bethel.
About 2500 of the residents are sick, disabled, or
socially unaccepted. The remaining population consists of doctors, psychologists, pastors, teachers,
deacons, deaconesses, as well as many other Bethel
workers and their families.
The exhibit from Bethel entitled "Creating-Working-Helping" was displayed on VU campus at
Deaconess Hall last spring and is touring in the US
through 1987.
The Cresset

IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
Christians and Political Debate
Few aspects of religious life in America are less
edifying than the mutual bashing that regularly takes
place between Christians on the political Right and the
political Left. Politics is serious and often nasty business, and it becomes notably the more so when
ideological differences get compounded by doctrinal
intensities.
The political confusion that results from this matters
less than does the damage it inflicts on the general
Christian witness. We should not be surprised when
Christians disagree with each other about the political
implications of their faith . They have done so
throughout history and there is no plausible reason to
expect that situation to change. There is cause for dismay, however, when Christians turn their disagreements with each other about politics into charges of
bad faith and moral inadequacy.
Much of the time political differences between
Christians follow theological lines. Liberal Christians
are often liberal in general, and conservative Christians more often than not take a consistently conservative approach to the whole of life. Ideas cluster, and
so do people.
But not always: consider the Evangelicals. Evangelical Christians share a commitment to historic Christianity as commonly understood among orthodox believers (at least those in the Calvinist tradition) and
they are all dedicated to an intensive and complete
grounding of faith and life in the biblical witness.
Evangelicals lead integrated lives: all thought and action is submitted unconditionally to the lordship of
Christ and the test of scripture.
Yet in recent years, deep political divisions have arisen within the Evangelical community. Surveys indicate
that most Evangelicals tend to conservatism in their
political views (though many display a populist streak
on economic issues); Jerry Falwell cannot be said to
speak politically for the entire Evangelical community,
but he does represent the dominant trend within it.
Yet Falwell hardly goes unopposed. Evangelicals of a
liberal or radical political persuasion may still be a
minority, but they are increasingly visible and vocal.
Through groups such as Evangelicals for Social Action
and journals such as Sojourners the Evangelical Left has
made itself a significant force .
All this represents a marked break from the American Evangelical past, which has, in this century at
least, had a distinctively apolitical, or even anti-politiDecember, 1986

cal, tinge. Most Evangelicals have apparently now
changed their minds and decided that faith does, in
fact, have political implications, but they have not
found it possible to agree as to the specifics of those
implications. This has led to increasingly heated exchanges between Evangelicals of differing political
views.
The situation has grown serious enough that Ronald
Sider, a professor of theology at Eastern Baptist
Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, has publicly
proposed that something be done about it ("A Plea for
Conservative Radicals and Radical Conservatives," The
Christian Century, October 1, 1986). Profesor Sider
himself is on the political Left-he is chairman of
Evangelicals for Social Action and a contributing editor of Sojourners-but he is attempting to appeal to his
fellow Evangelicals above their partisan or ideological
loyalties. He deplores the attacks and name-calling on
all sides and urges the contending parties to listen
more openly and sympathetically to each other, to locate their points of disagreement more precisely, and
to covenant together to conduct their political debates
"civilly, honestly, fairly, and biblically."
Professor Sider's is an admirable and positive enterprise. He is surely right in urging Christians to conduct their political debates with each other in ways
that reflect and honor their common calling. The
church should be a zone of decency and integrity in
debate about public affairs, a place where political opponents transcend distortions, stereotypes, and exchanges of insults and instead attempt honestly to engage the issues in discussions that, in Professor Sider's
words, are "vigorous but not vicious."
Professor Sider is also right to suggest that the
Christion Right and Left have much to learn from
each other: radicals can teach conservatives that the
need for social justice is urgent and that pleas for
greater economic equality are not necessarily expressions of crypto-Marxism; and conservatives, for their
part, can usefully remind radicals that religious and
political liberty are essential to any decent politics and
that Leftist governments generally have wretched records in these areas.
Yet while applauding Professor Sider's initiative, we
also have to recognize its limits. Professor Sider is not
so naive as to believe that integrity and openness
among Christians in debate will eliminate deep disagreements and he is not suggesting some sentimentalized version of Christian fellowship whereby we refrain from plain speaking with each other, but he does
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appear rather more hopeful than is warranted about
the degree of common ground that is likely to be
staked out.
His problem stems precisely from his Evangelical
perspective. Throughout his essay, Sider returns regularly to the point that Evangelicals contending about
their politics must submit their differing views to the
test of scripture. He considers it "a farce" that both he
and Jerry Falwell "continue forever telling the American public that our contradictory public policy stands
are thoroughly biblical." The way out of this scandal
is for Evangelicals of all political persectives to sit
down together and "test the biblical validity" of their
conflicting views. That advice follows from Sider's view
that Christians must strive "to submit their total lives
to biblical revelation," but it unfortunately expects of
scripture other than what it can reasonably be expected to provide.
Most Christians have long since learned not to regard the Bible as a textbook on science; one wonders
why so many continue to look upon it as a primer on
politics. The Bible tells us what is necessary to make
us wise unto ·salvation, but it ought not be read as a
prime source on economics, sociology, or political
philosophy. The Old Testament contains many
eloquent passages on justice and equity, but general
moral exhortations addressed to a tribal theocracy can
hardly be expected to provide any sort of blueprint
for political behavior in the modern world. And the
New Testament simply does not address itself in any
concentrated way to the manner in which we ought to
make our political arrangements. Sider deplores the
habit of Christians bombarding each other with selective proof-texts, but for those determined to base their
politics in scripture, there is no alternative. Random
proof-texts are all they have.
The awkward reality is that there is no simple way
to translate general moral imperatives into public policy. We are enjoined by scripture to peace and justice,
but the precise definition of those terms and the
means by which they might best be achieved remains
entirely problematic. Search the scriptures as we
might, we are unlikely thereby to be able to sort out
our political differences. The general rules of Christian morality do place certain political options off limits-we cannot be racists or fascists-but within the
broad limits of the morally permissible there are endless possibilities for valid choice and perpetual debate.
Christians face the dilemma of having to apply
theological and moral principles to their political lives
but of disciplining themselves at the same time not to
pretend to know more than has been authoritatively
revealed to them. They know that they must behave
decently and charitably in politics and that they must

not succumb to dishonesty, self-deception, or selective
moral indignation in analysis of public policy. But
beyond that they have only prudence, fallible reasonand, one hopes, large doses of humility-to guide
them.
All of which is to say that if Christians hope to reach
common ground in political debate, they will find it
not through scouring the Bible for a proper political
program but through exercising the mutual love, forgiveness, and forebearance that the biblical gospel
urges on them and that embodies the unity they enjoy
which transcends politics. Beyond that, they are free to
fight like the devil.
C:

Day's End
The river makes its presence known
Lying back of town like a lead pipe.
Altering its face like time,
It sometimes flows backwards,
Windruffled like a bulldog's
Hair rubbed the wrong way.
But mostly it flows forward,
Still, reflecting naked
Bones of trees.
Having carried away the apple
Cores of a thousand lunches,
It circulates through
Sclerotic afternoons,
Meandering across my video screen,
Gently tugging my fingers
From their keys.
Then a whistle blows and
The wind rakes
Leaves across the asphalt.
The geese flying south
Honk overhead and
Beat back the light with
Powerful wings.
A shaft of sunlight
Stabs through the clouds.
The river gleams apocalyptic.

1

1

Eric Potter

t.
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Robert Benne

MUTUAL LOVE AND CHRISTIAN LOVE
Unresolved Tens ions in Christian Ethics

In a justly famous paragraph from his Interpretation
of Christian Ethics, Reinhold Niebuhr writes:
The ethical fruitfulness of various types of religion is
determined by the quality of their tension between the
historical and the transcendent. This quality is measured by two considerations: The degree to which the
transcendent truly transcends every value and achievement of history, so that no relative value of historical
achievement may become the basis of moral complacency; and the degree to which the transcendent remains in organic contact with the historical, so that no
degree of tension may rob the historical of its significance.1
In a yet relevant critique of various religious traditions of the time of his writing-the 1930s-Niebuhr
showed how such creative tension might be prematurely resolved, to the detriment of that tradition's
"ethical fruitfulness ." In the following, I do not wish
to criticize particular religious trends and groupsthough it would be fun to do so. Rather, I wish to
propose a more theoretical consideration of the relation between the historical (mutual love) and the transcendent (agape love}, arguing for a particular kind of
relation that does in fact enhance the fruitfulnesss of
Christian morality.
In pursuing this skeletal argument, I will move
through three steps: first, I will attempt descriptions
of what I mean by mutual and agape love; second, I
will analyze two common ways of prematurely resolv-

Robert Benne has recently returned to Roanoke College in
Salem, Virginia from a sabbatical leave in England. At
Roanoke he is the Jordan-Trexler Professor of Religion, the
Chairman of the Department of Religion and Philosophy,
and the Director of the Center for Church and Society. He
is author of The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism: A
Moral Reassessment (1981) . His most recent contribution
to The Cresset, "Neoconservatism and Neoliberalism: Is
There a Real Difference?" appeared in October, 1984.
December, 1986

ing the "quality of tension" between mutual and agape
love; third, I will illustrate a proper relation, i.e., one
that does not erode the quality of the tension, by considering the relation of the notion of friendship to the
ideal of Christian love. I do not claim much originality
in my analysis. It involves a blending of the insights of
Reinhold Niebuhr (An Interpretation of Christian Ethics),
Richard Niebuhr ("The Center of Value"), and Gilbert
Meilaender (Friendship).
I

The Christian ethical norm of agape arises from the
central religious proclamation of the Christian Gospel.
God demonstrates an incredible, discontinuous, and
surprising kind of love toward humankind in the
teaching, ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus the
Christ. That kind of love-saving, forgiving, justifying-provides the "transcendent" pole in our discussion; it is the grace of God. As such it has certain discernible qualities that put it into bold relief.
It is universal-directed at all humans. It aims at the
full redemption of the whole universe of being. God's
grace is offered to the just and unjust alike. While it
may give special consideration to the vulnerable, much
like a parent gives special attention to a child who has
special need, it nevertheless embraces all equally.
Second, God's agape love is disinterested; it does not
love because of the "worth" of its object nor is it conditioned by a guarantee of reciprocal response. This
gives it an initiating quality as well as a certain kind of
heedlessness; it does not calculate a return, though it
may wish one. This disinterestedness is also bound up
with forgiveness, the capacity to heal the ruptures in
relationships and start anew.
Third, God's agape love is steadfastly faithful; although all else changes, transcendent love is everlastingly trustworthy. Finally, though it may not be intrin1Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New
York: Meridian Books, 1958}, p. 5.
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sically a part of agape love, sacrifice is often involved
in the exercise of agape in a fallen world. Love that
is universal, disinterested, and steadfast will take into
itself the wrath involved in alienated existence. The
cross is a powerful symbol of the cost of expressing
agape love.
So the event of Christ is the revelation and expression of the character and will of God from the Christian religious viewpoint. The difficulty for Christian
ethics comes when it is supposed to make this religious
norm ethically relevant. And without doubt, that task
has stimulated a perennial debate within Christian history. How is God's love in Christ-agape-to be reflected in the lives of Christians enmeshed in history?
How is Christ related to culture in the Christian life?

In contrast to agape love, mutual
love is preferential. Persons choose
those others who fit them as friends
and spouses. Such "fits" are limited.
Being enmeshed in history, persons are involved in
many relations characterized by mutual lovefriendship and marriage are prime examples. Many
other relations are characterized by mutual respect,
enrichment, and usefulness that are not yet mutual
love but would be open to it should circumstances and
choice permit. Mutual love, to paraphrase Richard
Niebuhr, arises when one being with capacities and
potentialities completes, complements, and limits
another being. 2 There is a symmetry involved in
mutual love-a fittingness of being to being. Persons
reciprocally meet the needs, fit the capacities, and correspond to the potentialities of each other. Figuratively
put, we fill each other's cups. Such relations are generally sealed and shored by promises-either implicit or
explicit.
In contrast to agape love, mutual love is preferential.3 Persons choose those others who fit them as
friends and spouses. These "fits" among persons are
very limited in number. They require propitious circumstances, time for cultivation, and discriminate
choice. The deepest friendships of one's life are few in
number; the best marital bond only one. Without de-

II

H. Richard . Niebuhr, "The Center of Value," in Radical
Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1960), p. 103.

How then are mutual love and Christian love related? One possible response to that challenge might
be to deny the relation. Except for certain perversions
of the Lutheran two-kingdoms doctrine, and those applying mainly to social ethics, there is little danger of
such a denial in the theory of Christian ethics. But in
the practice of our lives such a danger is exceedingly
real.
Jeremy Taylor once wrote that "when friendship
was the noblest thing in the world, charity was little." 4
He was of course referring to historical epochs that
were dominated by classical notions of friendship; but
the truth of his remark cuts deeply to those of us who
can be comfortable with the rich mutualities of existence and therefore adopt what Richard Niebuhr
called the ethics of defense-narrowing one's circle of
care and concern only to those in our bonds of mutuality.5 Such narrowness is notoriously evident in the
way many Christians separate their "Sunday" lives
from their "Monday"; business is business, politics is
politics, and, not least, academics is academics.
If such an approach resolves the tension by separating the historical from the transcendent, another peril
is to make the transcendent (agape love) a simple possibility. Agape is prematurely claimed to be the direct

T he characteristics of friendships are explicated in fine
fashion in Gilbert Meilaender, Friendshi~A Study in
Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1981). My conclusions about the relation of
mutual and agape love are very similar to Meilaender's.

4
Quoted by Meilaender, p. l.
5H. R. Niebuhr, The Responsible Self (New York: Harper &
Row, 1963), p. 140.

2

3

nying the noble hyperbole suggested in the quote, one
cannot be "a friend to the world." Further in contrast
to agape's disinterestedness, mutual love is very interested in reciprocal response. It recognizes that we
are incomplete beings who need the delight, fascination, shared interests, struggles and values, intimacy
and affection, that arise in mutual relations.
Mutual love, unlike agape, is subject to change, as
the fittingness of being to being may change. Who has
not looked back with some melancholy at friendships
that are no more because capacities, experiences, and
value choices have changed each party enough to
erode the complementarity that once was present?
Finally, mutual love involves one in concrete responsibilities that lend a hard edge of particularismperhaps even a tendency to closure-that contrasts
with the open-endedness of agape. The human institutions and communities based on mutuality entail specific, responsible interests that often rest uneasily with
broader responsibilities. My responsibilities to my family, for example, lead me to actions that can only be
characterized as "defensive," sometimes necessarily so.

6
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norm for historical existence. The radical ethic of
Jesus is commended as direct guidance for the Christian life. Historically this has meant at times the disparagement of mutual love (there is very little in
Christian ethics on friendship) or the disparagement
of ordinary earthly vocations. Samuel Johnson complained that Charles Wesley, though capable of conversation befitting friendship, never satisfactorily engaged in it because he always had to be off to do the
Lord's work. 6

Just as God's action in Christ is in
a paradoxical and dialectical
relationship to the fallen creation,
so Christian ethics should not try to
dissolve the tension between mutual
and Christian love, but rather to
ensure that the tension is creative.
A more likely outcome of such a premature claim is
hypocrisy. One simply doesn't recognize the pressure
of mutuality and particular responsibility-let alone
self-interest-in one's own life. When I taught business
ethics in a seminary, I often noticed the withering
criticism made of the business person's quest for
profit-a necessity of that earthly vocation-even while
the seminarians were negotiating the right salary, pension plan, location, and parsonage for their first pastoral call. Yet they thought their lives fully expressed
agape love.
Another, but more admirable, effect of taking agape
as a direct norm for personal and social life is that
agape demands heroic accomplishment. One examines
one's involvements in reciprocal bonds and in the particular claims and counter-claims of historical existence
and rejects such a compromised life. A heroic effort is
made toward purity-the Mother Teresa ideal. (Incidentally, a secular illustration of this occurred in the
recent BBC rendering of Tender Is the Night, where
Dick Diver tries to ignore the asymmetrical relation
with Nicole and to love her with a consistent self-sacrificial love . . . with disastrous effects). I do not wish
to negate such a heroic ethic, but I also do not want
to allow it to sort out Christians into first-class and second-class teams. That is just another way of dissolving
the tension, leaving the majority of Christians with a
paralyzing bad conscience.
There is also a perennial tendency to make agape
love directly determinative for social ethics. Without

going further into it at this point, let me just say that
such a tendency leads to sentimentality and moralism,
an occupational hazard for Protestant churches at
least.

III
How, then, should the relation between mutual love
and Christian love be described? My simple answer is
that the relation is dialectical. Just as God's action in
Christ is in a paradoxical and dialectical relationship
to the fallen creation, so Christian ethics should not
try to dissolve the tension between mutual and Christian love, but rather to ensure that the tension is creative.
The norm or spirit of Christian love should act as
both a No and Yes to mutual love. It should serve as
a constant judgment on our complacencies, a constant
summons to richer moral possibilities and a standard
for discriminate decisions. 7 In biblical language, agape
is "the heaven that leavens the lump," although it is
not the lump itself.
Thus, Christian ethics should strongly affirm the
preferential bonds of friendship and marriage and
family life, but insist that the exclusiveness involved in
those bonds not become exclusivistic. The summons of
agape should be a dynamic force that strains against
narrow limits, enabling one to be open to all neighbors. Friendship should not snuff out charity.
Likewise, Christian ethics must gratefully recognize
humankind as needy creatures who reciprocally give
and receive, freely and equally. At the same time, they
must discern that the relations of mutuality are often
incapable of being created without the initiating quality of agape, for if we give only to receive, mutual relations are poisoned from the beginning. Further,
mutuality cannot be sustained without the forgiving
capacities of agape. In a finite and sinful world, mutuality is fragile and unstable; friendship frequently
needs an element of unconditional acceptance in order
to transcend the rupture of finely-honed mutualities.
Again, there is a yes to the qualities of mutual love,
but also a recognition that they are not sufficient.
While Christian ethics affirms mutual love as the
very stuff of our lives, it also must realistically accept
its changeableness. As we said earlier, the fittingness
of being to being changes with altered circumstances
of life. At the very least, agape encourages one to
work for the other's good, even when friendship passes. At a higher level, perhaps illustrated best in a solid
marriage, it adds the tenacity of steadfast commitment
7

6

Cited by Meilaender, p. 87.
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These are developed by Reinhold Niebuhr in his Interpretation, pp. 97-123.
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wherein persons stick with each other through a life~ong conversation, <illowing themselves to be changed
m order to maintain the "fit."

It's a Boy!
Agape challenges the myopia and
defensiveness that is such a temptation
in our work and our public life. At
the same time, Christian ethics must
realistically recognize and affirm
the particularity and tentative
autonomy of our worldly tasks.
Finally a word about vocations, those earthly places
of particular responsibility. Agape challenges the
myopia and defensiveness that is such a temptation in
our work and our public life. At the same time, Christian ethics must realistically recognize and affirm the
particularity and tentative autonomy of worldly tasks.
Agape cannot supplant those. But the freedom of the
Christian is such that the responsible deed can be
done somewhere along the continuum between defensive closure and irresponsible openness. There are no
strict guidelines or rules for such responsibility,
though there are supports and accountabilities in the
community of brothers and sisters as they reflect on
the nature of particular responsibilities.
IV

In conclusion, I am arguing that mutual and Christian love cannot be sorted out as inferior and superior
types, nor can they be separated. Mutual love provides
the created texture of life, but it is subject to distortion
and fracture in our fallen existence. Agape is the challe~ging and healing element that interacts dynamically
With mutuality. It is, in Anders Nygren's memorable
i~a~e, the scarlet thread that runs through history,
bmdmg together that which on its own would disintegrate.8 Or to put it another way-Richard Niebuhr'sGod's sovereignity is exercised more through crosses
than thrones.9
But t~e relation of mutual love and Christian love
is never tidy. There is great, but creative, tension between the two that can best be borne by those who are
confident that they are justified by grace rather than
how well they fit the two together, either practically or
theoretically.
Cl
8

Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London: SPCK 1957) p

9

H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New
York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 187.

137.
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(Matthew 1 :1-17)

He came from a long line of menfourteen masculine generations
from Abraham to David,
including Judah & Bros.,
then fourteen all-male generations
from David to the Deportation,
finally fourteen generations of men
from the Deportation to Him.
Through forty generations
from Abraham to Grandpa Jacob
(patient Joseph's father),
only four women were noteworthy
genealogical by-products:
"by Tamar," widowed Canaanite
daughter-in-law of Judah,
playing the prostitute,
came Judah's incest twins;
"by Rahab," Canaanite harlot,
came Boaz;
"by Ruth," the Moabite widow
bought with a parcel of land,
came Obed;
"by the wife of Uriah," the soldier
cuckolded to death,
came Solomon.
(These were the noteworthy women.)
T~en,

in the genealogy's penultimate generation,
m non-male-chauvinist fulfillment,
comes Joseph as "husband of Mary"Joseph, a husband second only to the Holy Ghost,
deterred from divorce by a dream;
Joseph, buoyed by the promise,
"She will bear a Son,"
one with a popular (boy's) name;
Joseph, step-father to the Christ
who is the Son of David
and the Son of Abraham
"by Mary," the Mother of God .

Bernhard Hillila

.
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James Nuechterlein

FAITH AND LEARNING IN THE
CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY
General Reflections and a Cautious Application

(Editor's Note: This essay was originally presented at a symposium held November 7-8, 1986, at Calvin College. Participants attended from Calvin, Valparaiso University, and
the University of Notre Dame. The general topic considered
at the symposium was " The Integration of Faith and Learning in the Disciplines as Reflected in Scholarship and Classroom Teaching.")

I have to begin these comments on a confessional
note. I have been presented to you as a political scientist who will speak on the integration of faith and
learning in that discipline. But both of those categorizations are somewhat misleading and require some
explanation and elaboration.
I

To begin with, I am not actually a political scientist.
In my undergraduate training at Valparaiso University, I acquired a double major in history and political
science. I went on to graduate school in the field of
American studies, where, it is true, I had a minor field
in American politics-as well as one in American literature-but where my major field was American history. After graduate school, I took a teaching job in
American history at Queen's University in Kingston,
Ontario, Canada, where I remained for seventeen
years. In my teaching there, I specialized in twentiethcentury U.S. history. My scholarly interests focused on
twentieth-century American political thought.
I returned to Valparaiso University five years ago as
Editor of The Cresset, a Lutheran Christian journal of
ideas, and also as a part-time teacher. For reasons of

convenience, I wound up in the Political Science department, where I teach courses in political philosophy
and in modern American political thought. I am thus
technically a political scientist, in that the Political Science department is my academic home- home being
here described in Robert Frost's sense as the place
where, when you have to go there, they have to take
you in.
But I still bring to my teaching in political science a
historian's perspective, and historians-even political
historians- are not political scientists. Some years ago
C. Vann Woodward, the great historian of the American South, wrote an essay encouraging historians to
avail themselves of social science methods and perspectives, but he added a cautionary note that struck me
then as it does today as definitive of the historian's distinct perspective: "In every true historian there is a
humanist with a profound respect for the varied particularity of human experience and a jealous regard
for the precise integrity of time and place in the remembrance of things past." 1 Which, being interpreted,
is why a historian-at least this historian-can never
truly be a social scientist.
It is a little awkward being a humanist in a social science department. As I have said to my students, I am
in the embarrassing position of teaching a discipline in
whose existence I do not believe. But there it is and
there I am, and I thought you should be set straight
as to the tenuous nature of my credentials in political
science.
II

But the problem of possible misrepresentation goes
1

James Nuechterlein is Editor of The Cresset and Associate Professor of Political Science at Valparaiso University.
December, 1986

C. Vann Woodward, "The Comparability of American
History," in C. Vann Woodward, ed., The Comparative Approach to American History (New York: Basic Books, 1968),
p. 16.
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farther and deeper than that. Our general, transdisciplinary topic these two days is the integration of faith
and learning, and I have to confess that for me the
degree to which faith and learning can genuinely be
integrated seems highly problematic. I am a Lutheran
(indeed, I sometimes think of myself as the last unreconstructed Lutheran), and so you will not be surprised to hear that I instinctively think of the relationship between faith and learning-or, in H . Richard
Niebuhr's classic formulation, between Christ and culture-not in terms of transformation or integration
but rather in terms of paradox and tension.

The most venerable view of the
Christian university sees its
essential work as "the fusion of high
intelligence and high religion."
Perhaps the most venerable view of the Christian
university sees its essential work as "the fusion of high
intelligence and high religion." (It was, indeed, precisely that vision that informed the founding of Christ
College, the honors college at Valparaiso University.)
But in the classical Lutheran view, that idea is one of
those commonplaces that most of us give casual assent
to but that do not stand up well under close analysis.
In the Lutheran perspective, faith and learning, while
they are not ultimately irreconcilable and while, indeed , they must for their mutual health inform each
other at certain points, do exist largely on different
planes and are incapable of essential fusion or integration. It is not learning that leads to or sustains faith,
and learning, for its part, does not rest on faith or require it for its justification.
I will not attempt any full theological elaboration of
the Lutheran position, except to note that it finds its
roots in Luther's controlling image of the condition of
humanity as being that of simul justus et peccator, that
is, the sense that men and women are at once fully sinners and full y saints, and that that paradoxical condition pervades an · of human nature and culture. 2 Thus
Luther's ambivalent view of everything human. In that
ambivalence Luther could, for example, speak harshly
of reason-the basis of all learning-insofar as it exists
in respect to faith and as part of a fallen and demonic
existence: reason, Luther said with characteristic moderation, is "the Devil's Whore," a "beast," an "enemy
of God, " a "source of mischief," "carnal," and "stupid ."

But he truly was ambivalent, not simply condemnatory. Within its own sphere and as part of the divinely
created order, Luther suggested, reason is God's greatest, indeed inestimable, gift. He in fact personified it
as the "inventress and mistress of all the arts, of
medicine and law, of whatever wisdom, power, virtue,
and glory men possess in this life."3
If we would maintain the tension Luther suggests, it
seems to me, we would perforce be skeptical of notions of integrating faith and learning in the academic
disciplines. Thus we would look questioningly at ideas
not merely of Christian physics or Christian chemistry
but also of Christian economics, Christian history, or
Christian political science. The tension in the very idea
of a Christian university stems from the fact that such
an idea suggests the union of two forms of community
that operate under different imperatives.
As Alexander Miller has suggested in his useful
study Faith and Learning, the university is involved in
an endless quest for truth while Christianity, if it is to
remain true to itself, must in some sense claim to be
the truth. The university, the body of learners, is a
community of inquiry, while the church, the body of
the faithful, is a community of conviction. Both communities speak of truth, but they do not do so in commensurable ways: the truths of Christianity are generated from a deeper level than reflection, evidence, and
logic, and they are not the same as the truths of
philosophy or science. 4
In the community of faith we speak necessarily-if,
one hopes, cautiously and with humility-of orthodoxy
and heresy; in the community of learning such ideas
are properly anathema. In the university reason must
be the only arbiter and have unlimited sway, and it
cannot do so if those whose job it is to safeguard orthodoxy attempt to act on their knowledge of reason's
potentially corrosive effect on faith by putting it under
restraints and prohibitions. John Henry Newman, who
surely understood reason's limits and dangers,
nonetheless also understood that a university must live
with the risks of reason let loose: " . . . if we invite
reason to take its place in our schools, we must let
reason have fair and full play. If we reason, we must
submit to the conditions of reason. We cannot use it
by halves . . . . "5
The tensions between the differing imperatives of
faith and learning thus create perplexing dilemmas for
the Christian university. Professor Miller, for example,
a deeply committed Christian, is nonetheless led by the
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logic of his belief in the necessary autonomy and
supremacy of reason within its sphere to conclude that
no university, including no Christian university, may
properly impose confessional tests in hiring its faculty:
" ... faculty appointments should be made purely on
scholarly merit, with due regard to wholesome variety
of conviction, but without any striving after an engineered orthodoxy." 6 Miller is clearly uncomfortable
with where his logic has led him-given his view, it is
difficult to see how over time a Christian university
could continue to remain Christian in any coherent
sense of the term-and he rather lamely concedes that
a church body may continue to secure control of a
university under its jurisdiction by "retaining certain
key positions in the hands of believing men." He implicitly acknowledges the corner he has painted himself into by immediately adding to this concession the
comment that "I cannot be too thankful that I am not
an Administrator responsible for deciding what these
positions are ." 7
The problems encountered in the tension between
faith and learning are hardly novel; those problems
tell part-though by no means not all-of the story of
the evolution of American higher education from its
religious origins to its present secular condition. That
story is too well known to require retelling here, but
I do want to pass on two recent sightings by Stanley
Hauerwas that dramatize just how far many American
universities have travelled from where they began and
how embarrassed they are by their points of origin. 8
The first involves an incident at Duke University,
where Professor Hauerwas presently teaches. Like
many universities, Duke has set a bronze plaque at the
center of its campus recalling the purposes of the university's founders, and that statement of purpose is
read on certain high ceremonial occasions. Duke's
statement is mostly unexceptionable for modern
academics: it speaks of advancing learning, defending
scholarship, developing a love of freedom and truth,
promoting a spirit of tolerance, etc. But at the very beginning of the statement stands a distinct awkwardness. The very first aim set forth for Duke University
is to "assert a faith in the eternal union of knowledge
and religion set forth in the teachings and character of
Jesus Christ, the son of God." At the recent inauguration of Duke's President, when the chairman of the
Board of Trustees read the statement, he omitted the
offending passage.
The second sign of the times Hauerwas alerts us to
6
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concerns Harvard University. Contemporary versions
of the Harvard shield indicate that its motto is the simple word Veritas. But, Hauerwas informs us, the full
motto of the university actually reads Veritas: Christo et
Ecclesia. So at Harvard the truth that was originally to
be pursued for Christ and the church now presumably
exists only for its own, purely secular, sake.
Such stories may amuse us and confirm our sense of
where universities have come to, but they hardly surprise us. And if the case I have been making for the
problematic nature of the relationship between faith
and learning has any merit, one might well argue that
the path that the Dukes and the Harvards have taken
is both understandable and correct, a cause for regret
only to those awash in reactionary nostalgia for a vanished pre-modern past. If we do not lament the passing of the age of Christendom, why mourn the demise
of the Christian university, especially if the very
phrase Christian university constitutes, if not quite an
oxymoron, at least a term with little substantive content?
Presumably those of us in this gathering would
demur from that judgment. Even my own somewhat
skeptical view of the integration of faith and learning,
you will note, has included the escape clause that the
two, for their mutual health, should inform each other
at certain points. How then might a modest reconstruction of the idea of the Christian university and of
the relationship between faith and learning proceed?

III
We might begin where every discussion of university
affairs in America seems to begin these days, with the
matter of values. We have to be very careful here, I
think. There is, in some circles, a kind of creeping
Christian arrogance that appears to assume that we
are the only people concerned with moral values or
equipped to deal with them. From that questionable
assumption there easily develops the notion that Christian universities hold some sort of patent on "character
formation" or concern for the "whole person." The
temptation so to view ourselves is compounded by our
knowledge that it is precisely these matters that currently preoccupy parents and alumni. It is embarrassing but true that significant parts of our constituency
care less about our academic standing than about our
capacity to insure the moral sturdiness and/or theological orthodoxy of the coming generation.
But if we must be cautious here, we need not be
apologetic. If we are not unique in our concern for
moral values, we do hold an advantage over secular institutions in that we operate from a more-or-less unified core of values that they either do not share or,
11

even if they do, they cannot claim. Most Americans
still anchor their moral values in religious beliefs.
Christian universities can talk about such things and
operate from them in ways that secular universities,
for a whole variety of reasons, cannot.
In my view, the Christian university is perhaps not
so much a place of Christian learning as it is a community of Christian learners. And a community of Christian learners should be a place where, whatever else
occurs, the people involved treat each other with the
distinctive love, forgiveness, and concern for the other
that ought to mark the Christian life. (This idea of the
Christian university as a community of Christian learners, incidentally, could have extricated Professor Miller
from the awkward position he got himself into over
the matter of faculty hiring.)
Here again, though, we must be careful. The Christian university will be concerned with the co-curricular
life of the entire community, but that cannot be its distinctive focus. We do not exist, after all, for the purpose of running the equivalent of a post-adolescent
Christian day camp. The informed heart is doubtless
of greater importance in the ultimate Christian scheme
of things than is the educated mind, but it is the latter
which is the proper central concern of the university.
A Christian university that is long on piety but short
on learning can no more justify itself than can a Christian hospital where the members of the medical staff
have rich devotional lives but are not quite up to snuff
on recent developments in health care.
Yet the matter of values is not dissociated from the
intellectual life of the university. Christian universities,
because they operate within a coherent frame of
values, can place learning in context and perspective
in a way that students seek and that, again, secular institutions find it difficult to know even how to approach. Students, like all the rest of us, are meaningseeking creatures; because Christian universities are
openly concerned with questions of ultimate purpose
and transcendent value, we can respond to student
concerns about questions which public institutions,
when they recognize them at all, can only relegate to
the realm of the ineffable. Secular universities are inclined to talk about religion only in historical, clinical,
positivist, or reductionist ways; we, on the other hand,
have the great advantage of being able to talk about
God without changing the subject.
Stanley Hauerwas has raised the issue of values as
they relate to the intellectual life of the university in
an intriguing context that might amplify our discussion here. 9 Much of the teaching life of the modern
university, Hauerwas notes, proceeds according to the
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Socratic method of critical inquiry, which claims a
moral value of its own. The task of the university, in
this view, is not to provide students with answers but
to make them unrelenting questioners of all unexamined assumptions or items of conventional wisdom. That process takes on moral stature as it makes
students practitioners of the examined life and thus,
presumably, more self-conscious and perceptive moral
agents.
What is generally overlooked, Hauerwas claims (in
an argument borrowed from Martha Nussbaum), is
that the Socratic method can itself lead in dubious
moral directions. If placed in the hands of those lacking a secure moral foundation, the Socratic dialectic
can turn its practitioners into cynics adept at undermining all forms of conventional morality (insofar as
they cannot be rationally justified) but with nothing to
put in conventional morality's place. According to this
view, Socrates was dangerously indifferent to the antecedent moral training of those he engaged in dialectic. He gave intellectual weapons to those who, lacking
habituation in the moral virtues, could easily come to
mistake intellectual cleverness for moral perception.
The Hauerwas/Nussbaum argument (which I have
barely sketched here) certainly corresponds to much of
what I experience with my better students. It is all too
easy-it may, indeed, be a natural process of intellectual development-for bright students to go through a
debunking, scoffing, skeptical phase, one in which
they meet Oscar Wilde's definition of the cynic as the
person who knows the price of everything and the
value of nothing. At a debased level, the Socratic style
of relentless questioning may contribute to the abiding
sin of most students I encounter, which is not the
blind dogmatism or even bland indifference that one
hears so much of, but rather the maddening, mindless
relativism that debases tolerance and that manages to
avoid serious engagement with substantive moral and
intellectual questions by instant retreat to the impregnable fortress of "well, it all depends on your point of
view."
Should not Christian universities be better
positioned than secular universities to avoid or at least
know how to deal with this form of corruption of
youth? The point of course is not to discard the Socratic method but rather to undergird dialectical inquiry with the presumption that one is asking questions not simply in order to uncover intellectual weaknesses, expose unexamined premises, and probe traditional authority but in order finally, having done all
these things, to be led to dependable answers. And
one can only lead students to find answers if one believes oneself that answers do in fact exist, and exist
at a level somewhat more substantial than that of
The Cresset

"whatever works for you."
There is more that could be said here, but I want
to extend the discussion a step further by borrowing
the arguments of yet another scholar who has pondered the purposes of the Christian university, in this
case my colleague, Mark Schwehn. 10
Schwehn attempts to outline the distinctive perspective of the Christian scholar by setting it over against
what he calls "Weberianism," a construct built on his
reading of Max Weber's famous essay, "Science as a
Vocation." Weber there argued that "the fate of our
times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of
the world.' Precisely the ultimate and most sublime
values have retreated from public life either into the
transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations."
The university partakes centrally in this process of
intellectualization, which has at its core the assumption
that we can "in principle master all things by calculation." The end of academic life for the Weberian university, then, according to Schwehn's reading, is nothing less than mastery of the world, which is effected
by scholars engaged in endless efforts to extend the
limits of their disciplines.
The Weberian university, existing as it does in a disenchanted scientific world, has a purely instrumental
approach to knowledge and rigorously limits the kinds
of questions it supposes it can or should undertake to
answer.
Thus . . . the natural scientist teaches us what we
must do if we wish to master life technically, but he cannot and hence should not consider the question of
whether it ultimately makes sense to do so .... The historical and cultural sciences teach us to understand and
interpret literary and social phenomena, but they dare
not ask whether any given phenomenon is worthwhile.
In sum, the academician may clarify values but he dare
not promulgate them within the walls of academe ....
"Academic pleading [about ultimate questions] is meaningless in principle because the various value spheres of
the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each
other." ... Academics may not qua academics examine
ultimate questions, because there can be no academic
justification for any answer they might give to such
questions.
Christian universities, Schwehn suggests, have the
complex challenge of resisting this process of positivist
Weberian intellectualization without retreating into
anti-intellectualism or religious authoritarianism: "If
these institutions fail to resist total intellectualization of
10
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the sort that Weber describes, they will soon cease to
be Christian in any intelligible sense of the word. If,
on the other hand, they fail to maintain their commitments to free and open inquiry, they will soon cease
to be universities and colleges."
The Christian university's challenge to its Weberian
counterpart, Schwehn argues, should begin with the
Weberian claim that we can "in principle master all
things by calculation." Christians, on the basis of the
biblical stories that "both form and inform them,"
know that claim to be false. They know from their
reading of the Genesis story that humanity's fallen
condition stems precisely from "the repeated efforts of
human creatures to usurp the place of the Creator."
Any presumption of total human mastery through
human reason is "diabolical." This Christian insight is
central.
The Christian school that begins with a sense of the
limits of academic learning will not be tempted to construe the character of academic life as progressing ad infinitum toward increasing mastery of the world. Indeed,
this characterization of academics should remind the
Christian of the story of the tower of Babel: academics
devote themselves entirely to making monographic
bricks that will be superseded by other bricks and then
others and then still others in an ever-ascending structure of knowledge. The Christian university, because of
its constitutive convictions about the limits of human intellectual powers, will replace the Weberian image of
specialized workers constructing a tower with an image
of a community enriching and thereby extending a conversation. This latter image of the Christian university
calls attention to its traditional character, as opposed to
the anti-traditional character of the Weberian academy.
The Christian university feels obliged or should feel
obliged to maintain a living relationship to its past. It
seeks to think not only about its past but with it as well.
The Weberian academy, by contrast, denies that one
can do both of these things at one and the same time.
To think about a text and to think with it: this is conversation. To think only about a text and to claim that
one cannot responsibly think with it as an academic: this
is Weberianism. The Weberian academic asks only
whether what someone says about what a text means is
true or false. The Christian academic asks this question
too, but he may also ask whether what a given text says
about what we are to do and how we are to live is true
or false. Christian academics may not and probably will
not agree about the answers to these questions, but they
can and should agree, against the Weberians, that such
questions should be asked and answered within the
academy.
I have considerably abbreviated and foreshortened
Schwehn's argument, but I hope I have communicated
the sense of it. It needs, I think, no further gloss. It
suggests, to my mind, a picture of a Christian university as a place where Christian learners engage in lib13

era! learning informed by the Christian faith.
That engagement is not without tensions and complications: the Christian intellectual, while he must at
certain points reject the message of modernity, has
himself necessarily made the journey through modernity, and he cannot, without self-deception, suppose
he has come through the journey untouched and unaffected. The Christian intellectual's mentality is postmodern, not pre-modern, and that makes the Christian intellectual life a good deal more ambiguous and
equivocal than it otherwise would be. To get beyond
Weber, we must first go through Weber, and even
after we have passed him by, a significant part of him
will forever remain with us.
IV
Some of you may be wondering by now when if ever
I intend to descend from the ethereal realms of high
generalization and come to grips with the topic assigned and announced: the integration of faith and
learning in the disciplines, in this case, the discipline
of political science. Given my confession that I am not
truly a political scientist and that I am skeptical of the
degree to which faith and learning can be integrated,
you will perhaps understand my reluctance to get to
the point.
·
But I do not mean to dodge entirely, and I have by
now, I hope, sufficiently made clear my view that
short of integration there are still things that faith and
learning have to say to each other. As I reflect on the
effects of my Lutheran Christian beliefs on my
academic work in modern American political thought,
I am led to two disparate conclusions: 1) there has
never been any explicit intrusion of distinctively Christian views into anything I have ever written-at least
at the scholarly level-on American political life and
thought; and yet, 2) virtually everything I have ever
thought or written on modern American politics has
been thoroughly informed, indeed pervaded, by Lutheran presuppositions. Before I expand on that, allow
me a brief excursus on some recent disputes over
political thought in the field of political science.
The Weberian perspective sketched by Mark
Schwehn has had its impact in political science as elsewhere. Indeed, ever since Thomas Hobbes outlined
his emotive theory of value in the seventeenth century,
the positivist influence has been on the advance.
Hobbes was a modernist before his time: judgments of
good and evil, he argued, have nothing to do with the
inherent qualities of the beliefs or actions to which
they are applied; they are simply expressions of our
feelings about those ideas and beliefs. In Hobbes' own
words: " ... whatsoever is the object of any man's ap-
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petite or desire, that is it which he for his part calls
good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and
of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words
of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that uses them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of
good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves."
That perspective found major reinforcement in
modern times with the development of the whole idea
of social science and the rise in its wake of empirical
political analysis. As political science rose in esteem,
political thought fell. Political philosophy never entirely
disappeared from political science curricula, but it certainly declined in significance, and the field itself was
increasingly defined in empirical, as opposed to normative, terms.

The Christian intellectual, while he
must at certain points reject the
message of modernity, has himself
necessarily made the journey through
it, and he hasn't done so untouched.
In recent years, the pos1Uv1st impulse has come
under increasing attack; as noted earlier, people are
suddenly interested in values again. The attacks came
from Leo Strauss and his disciples on the right, who
expressed utter disdain for the very idea of a natural
science of politics and urged in its stead a return to
serious consideration of Platonic forms of the Good, as
well as from groups on the left like the Caucus for a
New Politics, which depicted the pretensions of scientific analysis of process and power as a form of mystification whose effect, if not always intent, was to provide support for the existing socio-political system.
Criticism came as well, of course, from people with no
particular ideological or disciplinary axe to grind who
simply concluded that empirical political analysis left
too many essential questions unanswered-or even unasked.
This rising tide of discontent helps explain the extraordinary success of John Rawls' A Theory of justice,
which appeared in 1971. It is not too much to say that
Rawls' book virtually by itself resuscitated the field of
normative political theory. Much of the acclaim for the ,
work stemmed from its intrinsic merit-Rawls' is an
extraordinarily rich analysis-but it stemmed as well
from Rawls' managing to raise, in intellectually respectable terms, questions of value, to reestablish an
intelligible relationship between fact and value, the is
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and the ought. Through the use of a device borrowed
from game theory, Rawls built a bridge between
analytical and normative analysis. Since the appearance of A Theory of justice, normative theory has enjoyed a steady, if modest, revival.
End of excursus . . . and return to how Lutheran
presuppositions have informed my own very modest
attempts to think-admittedly in a normative as well as
analytic manner-about modern American political
thought. I propose very briefly to sketch not what I
have written on the subject-that would be too self-referential an exercise-but rather the Lutheran assumptions that have led me to think the way I do. I want
to outline, in other words, a Lutheran approach to
politics-note, please, that I stipulate a Lutheran approach, not the Lutheran approach. Had I not so
stipulated, I am sure that at least some of my Valparaiso colleagues-who for reasons that I find incomprehensible find my politics uncongenial-would have
hastened to stipulate in my stead. I will not insist that
my approach to politics is the only valid one from Lutheran assumptions, but I do claim it as the most venerable in the tradition.
The Lutheran understanding of politics rests on the
doctrine of the two kingdoms, which in turn can be
seen as the natural correlative of the characteristic Lutheran distinction between law and gospel. Two kingdoms thought, of course, is not original with Luther:
he took the concept over from St. Augustine, though
he modified it in ways I have not the time to spell out
here. Both kingdoms, Luther said, belong to God and
are answerable to him; but he rules over them under
different rubrics. They exist in dialectical relationship
to each other, as befits the simul nature of the human
condition. They cannot entirely be separated because
the Christian lives in both, but they can be distinguished in principle and function .
In the kingdom of the right hand, the realm of the
gospel, the governing principle is love, and the kingdom lives according to grace. The kingdom of the left
hand, in which politics resides, is the kingdom of law.
Its governing principle is justice and it has a legitimate, indeed necessary, place for the exercise of
power and coercion. The Christian magistrate need
feel no bad conscience when in his official capacity he
refuses to forgive seventy times seven or to turn the
other cheek. The left-hand kingdom must be run according to the law because of the persistence and pervasiveness of sin. Because of sin, Luther concluded, it
is neither necessary nor even possible to run the state
by the gospel: "... a man who would venture to govern an entire country or the world with the gospel
would be like a shepherd who would place in one pen
wolves, lions, eagles, and sheep together and let them
December, 1986

freely mingle with one another and say, Help yourselves, and be good and peaceful among yourselves.
. . . The sheep, forsooth, would keep the peace and
would allow themselves to be ... governed in peace,
but they would not live long . . . . "
We are all familiar with the charges brought against
this view. Let me quickly review them and respond to
them. The fundamental charge is that Lutheranism ineluctably intends to otherworldliness, quietism, excessive preoccupation with order-in a word, conservatism.
The simplest thing to say in response to the claim
that two kingdoms thought conduces to political conservatism is that it's not necessarily so. 11 If we are to
place the blame for German conservatism in the 1930s
on Lutheran theology, what are we to say of the leftwing political cultures of the Scandinavian nations,
countries whose religious traditions were more
thoroughly Lutheran than was ever the case in Germany? Those inclined to draw direct lines from
Luther to Hitler need to remind themselves of the uncertain relationship between religious faith and political practice as well as of the variables other than religion that enter into political choice. In any case, Lutherans have been-and still are--diverse enough in
their political preferences to bring into serious question any reductionist theory of Lutheranism's necessary conservatism.
Considered without prejudice, two kingdoms
thought is not essentially quietist. That charge arises
from the mistaken assumption that in insisting on the
integrity and supremacy of the gospel, Lutherans
thereby denigrate all those areas of life that fall within
the kingdom of the left hand. Yet to say that something is not of ultimate significance is not at all to
deny its penultimate urgency. If Christians must of
necessity love God and the gospel of forgiveness in
Jesus Christ above all else, that is not to say that by
that token they reduce to insignificance all those Godgiven gifts that provide life its sweetness and savor:
family, friends, career, community. There is in fact
nothing in Lutheran thought that would lead Christians to suppose that they can love God and yet despise the world in which he has placed us.
There is no way for Christians to ignore or
minimize politics. Since politics is important to our
lives, it will perforce be important to our lives as
Christians. We must, if we take our faith seriously,
apply it in a serious way to the things that make a dif11
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ference to us, and politics, whether we want it to or
not, does make a difference. The kingdom of the left
hand remains God's kingdom .
A variation on the charge of quietism brought
against the two kingdoms notion involves what its critics take to be its unduly negative emphasis. Luther
regularly spoke of government in the context of its
duty to preserve order in a fallen world, and one can
easily get from him an idea of the state as simply a
necessary evil, brought into being and finding its justification solely as a device to keep peace among sinful
men and women who would , in its absence, tear each
other and the social fabric apart. Thus it is a temptation for Lutherans to think of secular rule almost exclusively in terms of coercion, prohibition, and restraint and to fail to appreciate its positive and creative
uses.
Luther, of course, is hardly alone in his emphasis on
government's role as preserver of social peace. The
idea that government exists first of all to preserve
order is a commonplace of political philosophy. Yet it
may be that Lutherans are excessively inclined to stress
this negative, if essential, function of the state and less
ready than they should be to take a more expansive
and generous view of its purposes. The heirs of
Luther have perhaps failed adequately to translate his
political prescriptions into terms appropriate to a modern and democratic political system that the reformer
himself had no way of imagining or anticipating.
Here is a case where the antidote to Luther may be
found in Luther himself, specifically in his doctrine of
vocation. The teaching that it is the Christian's duty
and joy to serve God and neighbor in the place in
which God has placed him has obvious implications for
the role of the modern Christian as democratic citizen.
The application of the doctrine of vocation to the notion of the two kingdoms can free Lutheran political
thought of negative and restrictive connotations and
provide all the theological justification that any Christian activist could wish for. In the process, it can also
lay to rest the idea that two kingdoms thought leads
inexorably to political conservatism.
It is tempting to rest the matter there, secure in the
assurance that the doctrine of the two kingdoms has
been shown to be free of ideological taint. But the
matter is not quite that simple. Lutherans need not be
political conservatives, but they may naturally be inclined to be philosophical conservatives. The Augustinian strain of piety emphasizes that any social system
will necessarily bear the marks of sin and finitude . Lutherans may be many things politically, but they cannot be utopians. They will look on promises of new
political orders and new breeds of humanity with instinctive skepticism. Lutherans need in no way be inhib-
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ited from struggling for social justice, but they will
never fall prey to the superstition that humanity's alienation is simply a function of inadequate social arrangements.
Even as the gospel spurs among Lutherans a response of love that will, where appropriate, take political forms , it simultaneously reminds them of the contingent and proximate nature of politics, and thus of
its limits. Lutherans, even in their most intense moments of social engagement, will remain in some sense
other-minded. They will never fail to distinguish their
vision of the present and coming kingdom of grace
from any existing or potential political order; they will
refuse, in short, to immanentize the eschaton. As
Luther understood, eschatological urges in politics
tend to pose dangers for sheep.
If one holds to the set of views just outlined, one is
predisposed along certain lines of political analysis, regardless of the particular culture, period, or political
system under consideration. You should not find it
difficult to guess, for example, how I came out in my
analysis of New Left political thought of the 1960s.
Nor should you be surprised to learn that George
McGovern was, in terms of political philosophy, my
least favorite presidential candidate of recent times.
(McGovern traced his political ideas to what Lutherans
are bound to perceive as the illusions of the social gospel.)
Yet, as already suggested, the movement from
theological perceptions to political theory is not necessarily direct, unambiguous, or predetermined. One's
theology does not write one's political analysis. Many
who hold the kinds of views I have outlined are conservatives, but then one thinks of a Reinhold Niebuhr,
who while not a Lutheran held enough Lutheran-like
views to be accorded honorary fellowship, and who remained throughout his life a man of the left.
It seems to me that the forces that shape our
academic thought and work are far too complex, disparate-and often rightfully secular-for us to be able
to talk easily of the integration of faith and learning.
As with the two kingdoms, things that can never entirely be separated can and often must be distinguished.
And yet, of course, it would be a very peculiar religious faith that had no discernible effect at all on the
way we think about the world. Men and women of
faith will not simply on that account agree about the
condition and shape of culture, but they will agree-at
least in essential terms-about the nature and destiny
of humanity, and what one thinks about where the
world is ultimately headed will necessarily have some
effect on (even if it will not determine) one's views as
to where it has been in the past and where it is now. Cl
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Glenn N. Schram

REALISM RECONSIDERED
Morgenthau, Kennan, Niebuhr, and Voegelin

The school of realism in the study of international
politics reached its zenith about 1950, when the era of
bipolarity and atomic power had just begun, when the
basic similarities between our erstwhile totalitarian ally
and our erstwhile totalitarian foe were becoming clear,
and when it was common to perceive the hopes of the
previous half century for perpetual peace as illusory.
Today, although the conditions of international life remain very much the same, realism is not so popular as
it was. It may be helpful, therefore, to recall it as it
used to be.
The middle of the century was the time of a great
flowering of political thought in this country. A
number of the contributions were initially made during the late 1940s and early 1950s as lectures under
the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation at
the University of Chicago. Included in this group were
contributions to democratic theory by Jacques Maritain
and Yves R. Simon, as well as analyses by Leo Strauss
and Eric Voegelin of the spirit of the times and how
it developed.
This spirit, as defined by Voegelin, was manifested
in international politics in what one major realist,
Hans]. Morgenthau, called utopianism, and another,
George F. Kennan, called the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems; and Morgenthau
and Kennan decried utopianism, and the legalisticmoralistic approach, in works also presented initially as
Walgreen Foundation lectures.*
Morgenthau and Kennan were two of the three
great American realists. The third was Reinhold
Niebuhr. This article will look first at the ways in
which these three defined realism, and then suggest
that Morgenthau's realism rested on a too pessimistic
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view of human nature and Kennan's on a too optimistic view, and that the chief lesson to be learned from
the three is their critique of what Voegelin would have
called gnosticism in international politics.
*Other Walgreen lectures were a second series by Strauss,
on Machiavelli; a third series on democracy, by John H.
Hallowell; and a series by Kurt Riezler on governmental
decision-making in modern society. Except for Riezler's
lectures, which were printed in January 1954 in the journal Ethics (Vol. 64, No. 2, Part II, pp. 1-55), the Walgreen
lectures were published as books as follows: Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951); Yves R. Simon, Philosophy of Democratic Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Leo
Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953); Eric Voegelin, The New Science of
Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); Hans
J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, I900-I950 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951); Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); and John H. Hallowell, The
Moral Foundation of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). Kennan's book was reprinted with two
new chapters in 1984. (Clinton Rossiter's The American
Presidency [New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956] was also
presented intially as a series of Walgreen lectures, but it
lacks the philosophical interest of the other works.)
Other books referred to in this article are Edward H .
Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955); Hans J.
Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century (abridged edition) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971);
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of
Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944);
Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems
(New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1953); Reinhold
Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1952); and Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis
(Munich: R. Piper & Co., 1966). The discussion below of
Morgenthau's views on the nature of politics is based on
Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Evil of Politics and the Ethics
of Evil," Ethics, Vol. 56, No. 1 (October 1945), pp. 1-18.
For further details on the problem of Kennan and the
American self-interpretation, also discussed below, see my
article "George F. Kennan and the Current Civil Theology," Center journal, Vol. 2, No.4 (Fall 1983), pp. 67-77.
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For the clearest and most concise account of realism
by Morgenthau we must turn, not to his Walgreen lectures, but to his Politics in the Twentieth Century. Here
he speaks of the "history of modern political thought"
as "the story of a contest between two schools which
differ fundamentally in their conception of the nature
of man, society, and politics." The schools are realism
and utopianism. This characterization of modern political thought is not altogether accurate, but the contest
to which Morgenthau refers does exist in the field of
international politics. In examining his juxtaposition of
the tenets of the two schools, we shall gain an understanding of his conception of realism.
Utopianism "believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract principles, can be achieved here and now"; realism "believes that the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of forces inherent in
human nature." Utopianism assumes that human nature is infinitely malleable and trusts in education, reform, and the sporadic use of force to attain its ends;
realism holds that one must work with human nature,
not against it, "through the ever temporary balancing
of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts." In international politics realism encourages the
pursuit of the national interest, which "encompasses
the integrity of the nation's territory, of its political institutions, and of its culture."
Although in the discussion just quoted Morgenthau
pits realism against utopianism alone, in the book
based on his Walgreen lectures, In Defense of the National Interest, he speaks of utopianism as but one of
four interrelated errors of American foreign policy
during World War II and the immediate postwar
period. The other errors were legalism, which looked
forward to world order through world law; sentimentalism, according to which the national interest was unworthy to be a goal of foreign policy and should be replaced by the pursuit of universal moral values; and
neoisolationism, which held that America could attain
its foreign-policy aims without recourse to traditional
methods of diplomacy.
Turning to Kennan, we find that his realism is distinguished not so much by a set of precepts juxtaposed
to the legalistic-moralistic approach as by sheer opposition to it. In the book based on his Walgreen lectures, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, he says of the
legalistic-moralistic approach:
It is the essence of this belief that, instead of taking the
awkward conflicts of national interest and dealing with
them on their merits with a view to finding the solutions least unsettling to the stability of international life,
it would be better to find some formal criteria of a
juridical nature by which the permissible behavior of
18

states could be defined.
Kennan maintains that the legalistic-moralistic approach "runs like a red skein through our foreign policy" of the first half of the twentieth century. Its greatest defect, he says, is its moralism. "Whoever says
there is a law must of course be indignant against the
lawbreaker and feel a moral superiority to him." The
result is that when a conflict leads to war there is a demand for the complete subjection or the unconditional
surrender of the lawbreaker.
Kennan comes closest to offering an alternative to
the legalistic-moralistic approach at the end of these
deliberations, where he writes, "[I]f our own purposes
and undertakings here at home are decent ones, unsullied by arrogance or hostility toward other people
or delusions of superiority, then the pursuit of our national interest can never fail to be conducive to a better world." One may wonder, however, whether this
aspiration is altogether realistic-a problem which
brings us to Niebuhr.
Niebuhr distinguishes realism from idealism, the latter corresponding to utopianism in Morgenthau's
thought and the legalistic-moralistic approach in Kennan's work. According to Niebuhr, "In political and
moral theory 'realism' denotes the disposition to take
all factors in a social and political situation, which
offer resistance to established norms, into account,
particularly the factors of self-interest and power."
Idealism is disposed to ignore or be indifferent to such
factors. "This disposition," he says,
IS
general
whenever men are inclined to take the moral pretensions of themselves or their fellowmen at face value;
for the disposition to hide self-interest behind the
facade of pretended devotion to values, transcending
self-interest, is well-nigh universal."
Although Niebuhr sometimes wrote as if he believed
that any pursuit of the national interest in Morgenthau's sense was sinful, what he probably meant was
that sin enters into the pursuit when a nation attaches
greater weight to its interest than in justice it deserves,
or when a nation overextends its capabilities in pursuing its interest. In any case Niebuhr thought sin to be
frequently involved in the pursuit of the national interest, and here he departed from Kennan's apparent
belief that arrogance, hostility, and a sense of
superiority could be removed from foreign affairs.
As for the day-to-day conduct of these affairs,
Morgenthau preferred the pursuit of the national interest through traditional methods of diplomacy, particularly the balance-of-power approach; unfortunately
his use of the term "balance of power" was ambiguous,
and the fact was fully exploited by his critics. Kennan
espoused a high-minded conception of national purThe Cresset

pose at variance with Niebuhr's belief that the actions
of all nations tend to be tainted by sin. Niebuhr was
wary of a too uncritical acceptance of Morgenthau's
view, arguing "that a nation that is too preoccupied
with its own interests is bound to define those interests
too narrowly," for "it will fail to consider those of its
interests which are bound up in a web of mutual interests
with other nations" (the emphasis is Niebuhr's).
The chief objects of realist criticism at midcentury
were the foreign policies of Woodrow Wilson and Cordell Hull. An admirer of Wilson's, Edward H.
Buehrig, said thirty years ago in an unusually wellwritten book on Wilson's foreign policy that the work
of Morgenthau and Kennan had had a beneficial effect in stimulating a reassessment of American diplomacy during World War I. Buehrig referred specifically to the realist view that the correct policy for Wilson "would have been calculation and restraint aimed
at ending the war as soon as possible without catastrophe to either side, thereby preserving a balance in
Europe which would least disturb the outside world
and contribute most to the future stability and pacification of Europe itself."
When we look at the assumptions underlying the
realists' works, we find that Morgenthau had a more
pessimistic view of human nature than even Niebuhr
had. Morgenthau believed that politics is evil to the
degree to which its essence and aim are "power over
man," because it thereby degrades man to a means for
other men; that "[t]he test of a morally good action is
the degree to which it is capable of treating others not
as means to the actor's ends but as ends in themselves"; and that politics at best involves the choice of
the least evil among several possible actions.
Surely it cannot be true that every attempt to impose one human will on another is evil. One need
think only of the wise exercise of parental authority or
the attempt to prevent a tyranny from expanding its
area of domination. The means by which an attempt
of this kind is undertaken may be unwise and tainted
by sin, but the attempt need not be inherently evil.
Even Kant, whose thought Morgenthau's views so very
much resemble, believed human dignity to be violated
only when one person treats another solely as a means
to attaining the first person's end, and not simultaneously as an end in himself.
Niebuhr did not believe international politics to be
inherently sinful, although he did believe that at times
nations have to choose the lesser of evils. Though he
saw through the moral pretensions by which nations
seek to mask their interests, he tended to be more understanding of these pretensions than Morgenthau,
maintaining that man has "so strong a sense of obligation to his fellows that he cannot pursue his own inDecember, 1986

terests without pretending to serve his fellowman"-a
fact which, in Niebuhr's judgment, belied the concept
of total human depravity.
Yet Niebuhr would have had reservations about
Kennan's admonition to his countrymen to pursue
ends unsullied by such things as arrogance, not because the advice is ignoble but because it is even more
difficult for nations than for individuals to follow.
That Kennan could expect Americans to follow such
advice in pursuing their national interest, conducive to
a better world, was due to his retention of aspects of
the American self-interpretation which he had expressed in 1947 in his famous, pseudonymous article,
"The Sources of Soviet Conduct." In its analysis of the
aims of Soviet foreign policy this article is a model of
realism. It is reprinted as an appendix to American Diplomacy, 1900-1950.

When we look at the assumptions
underlying the realists' works, we
find that Hans Morgenthau had a
more pessimistic view of human nature
than even Reinhold Niebuhr had.
In the article Kennan maintains that the Soviet challenge is a providential test of American virtue and that
our meeting the challenge depends on our fulfilling
our destiny to exercise moral and political leadership
in the world. These assertions are a variation on two
aspects of the American self-interpretation as
examined by Niebuhr in The Irony of American History,
which apeared in 1952, one year after Kennan published his Walgreen lectures. According to Niebuhr,
Americans believed, at the time he wrote, that a special American Providence would reward or punish
them according to the degree of their virtue, and that
they were destined to lead the world, chiefly though
not exclusively by example, in preserving and extending democracy. These beliefs are reflected not only in
Kennan's article but also in the optimistic assessment
of American potential in the body of his book. (In the
light of his recent writings, one may question whether
Kennan is currently as realistic in his appraisal of the
Soviet Union as he was in 1947, and whether he still
believes the parts of the American self-interpretation
to which he once adhered.)
It should be noted that the idea of American destiny
as discussed by Niebuhr is not without illusions of the
kind which beset utopianism, the legalistic-moralistic
approach, and idealism; all these ways of thinking are
mild variants of what Voegelin called gnosticism. Voegelin, who died in 1985, was the first and greatest of
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a group of emigre political thinkers which included
Maritain, Simon, Strauss, and Morgenthau and which,
along with Niebuhr and Kennan, sought to come to
terms with the immense spiritual and political disorder
of the twentieth century and with the threat to the
West posed by Soviet Russia.
The shadow of Hitler and Stalin hung over almost
everything Voegelin wrote from the 1930s onward, including his seemingly unrelated, four-volume magnum
opus, Order and History. His most important ideas, like
those of most of the other writers just mentioned,
coalesced in highly compact form in his Walgreen lectures. But because Voegelin, who was a moralist despite himself, refused to engage in conventional
moralizing and to indulge shrill denunciations of totalitarianism, preferring to analyze the spiritual states
of the thinkers who set the stage for it, his own morality is sometimes questioned.
In addition, he made people uncomfortable by saying such things as that anyone who participates in
gnostic ideologizing today, now that we know what it
means, is an accomplice in the atrocities of Auschwitz
and the Gulag Archipelago. Although such a statement is undoubtedly too severe, it is hard to deny that
all gnostic ideologists are brothers under the skin. On
top of all this, Voegelin did not think that the West
was yet entirely immune to the lure of totalitarianism,
owing to the growing disorder of Western society and
the continued appeal of gnostic ideologies. How many
world wars and revolutions might be necessary before
the present extravaganza is over, he professed not to
know.
Voegelin is sometimes thought to have been a dogmatic theologian, but he disliked dogma because he
believed that it failed to convey the religious experience that engendered it; and he deplored the religious
strife that troubled France in the sixteenth century
and laid waste Germany in the Thirty Years' War. One
of the few modern thinkers whom he admired, Jean
Bodin, sought through mysticism to transcend the religious turmoil of sixteenth-century France, just as
Voegelin sought through the same means to transcend
the ideological strife of his day.
When asked his religious affiliation Voegelin would
say that he was Lutheran, and some support exists in
his earlier writing for this self-description. There is
reason to believe, however, that as time went on he
came to consider himself more and more a mystic and
a philosopher in the sense of an exponent of
Platonism and Aristotelianism and less and less a believer in a religious creed and the revelation on which
it is based. In this respect the following paragraph
from his Anamnesis, published in 1966, is instructive
(the translation is my own):
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A neotic [Platonic-Artistotelian] interpretation does not
arise independently of the conception of order of the
society in which it appears; it arises rather in a critical
encounter with that conception. Wherever noesis appears, it exists in a relationship of tension with the selfunderstanding of society. To illustrate, I would point
out only the tensions, all of great significance for the
history of the world, between philosophy on the one
hand and myth and sophistry on the other, between
philosophy and theology, and today between philosophy
and [gnostic] ideology. A confrontation of this kind
serves as the point of departure for the differentiation
in the course of which the noetic interpretation can become a "science" which treats political reality as its "object of study." The confrontation, moreover, works both
ways, so that the representatives of the current nonnoetic interpretations are not helpless against being treated
as objects by their noetic critics. They do not let themselves be forced without resistance into the role of an
"object of study," but rather view their noetic opponent
as an object of study from within their own conception
of order: from the standpoint of the cult of the polis
the philosopher is seen as an atheist; from the
standpoint of the theology of revelation he is seen as a
heretic; from the standpoint of revolutionary ideology
he is seen as a reactionary who represents a rival ideology.
Voegelin used gnostzctsm as a generic word for the
belief, which can take many forms, that the anxiety of
existence can be relieved and a state of bliss be
achieved on earth by following a prescription, varying
with the form, and calling, in effect, for the re-creation and moral perfection of man. V oegelin maintained that gnostic ideologies have existed in the West
since the Renaissance, and that they arose against the
background of Christian eschatology. In a well-known
(if obscurely written) passage in The New Science of Politics, he said: "The problem of an eidos in history,
hence, arises only when Christian transcendental fulfillment becomes immanentized. Such an immanentist
hypostasis of the eschaton, however, is a theoretical
fallacy." What this passage means, simplified slightly
and rendered in plain English, is that gnostics erroneously believe it possible to create heaven on earth.
Gnosticism may occur in a religious or a secular context. Liberation theology is gnostic, but so too is oldfashioned, antireligious Marxism. Gnosticism may take
an extreme form, as in Communism and National
Socialism, or it may be mild, like the unrealistic
ideologies of international politics which we have been
examining. Utopianism and the legalistic-moralistic approach are gnostic in their faith in wars to end all wars
and make the world safe for democracy, or in their
belief that peace can be permanently secured through
international law or international organization;
idealism is gnostic in thinking that if certain unpleasant facts are ignored they will go away.
Thus the chief lesson to be learned from the realists
The Cresset

is their criticism of gnosticism in international politics.
Also gnostic is the related idea, now virtually
exhausted, that America is destined through example
and action to help democratize the world. The idea is
gnostic in overestimating America's ability to secure
democracy at home by contributing to its preservation
and extension abroad.
One might ask whether Voegelin considered the defenses of democracy by Maritain and Simon, as well as
by Niebuhr in 1944 in The Children of Light and the
Children of Darkness, to be gnostic ideologies, however
mild. Voegelin certainly considered some persons on
the public scene in the America of his day to be gnostic "democratists." He did not comment on the works
of Maritain, Simon, and Niebuhr, and what he would
have said if asked is difficult to say. From the
standpoint of revealed religion their works do not appear to have been gnostic. It is therefore not inevitable
that the self-understanding of a democracy be gnostic.
A last word should be said about the tendency, unfortunately furthered by certain passages in Niebuhr
and Voegelin, to equate realism with Machiavellianism.
It is true that in a sense Machiavelli shared with the
realists, and especially with Morgenthau and Niebuhr,
a lack of illusion about human nature. But one has
only to compare the styles of the writers to see that,
whereas Machiavelli was cool and dispassionate in the
advice which he gave, the realists showed deep moral
sensibilities in their criticism of utopianism, legalismmoralism, and idealism as illusory and harmful.
Moreover, the realists would never have concurred
with Machiavelli's assertion that a desirable end justifies any means. Finally, it is arguable that, despite the
view of human nature which he expressed, Machiavelli
himself was a gnostic-indeed, that he was the first
great gnostic political thinker of the modern era-in
his belief that the "redemption" of Italy from foreign
domination could be effected by rejecting the classical
philosophers' goal of virtue and wisdom in government for "new modes and orders" (these terms are his,
the former occurring in the last chapter of The Prince
and the latter at the beginning of the introduction to
Book I of the Discourses).
Even when American politicians are being realistic
they are ordinarily not being Machiavellian; or, as Leo
Strauss said, "At least to the extent that the American
reality is inseparable from the American aspiration,
one cannot understand Americanism without understanding Machiavellianism which is its opposite."
Unrealistic thinking, in the forms which it took at
midcentury and still takes today, is part of the crisis of
the West, a crisis that is at bottom spiritual. In my
view, Voegelin was too hard on dogmatic theology.
Nonetheless, if his work helps to rekindle the spiritual
December, 1986

side of this civilization, or to provide a spiritual basis
for one which succeeds it, his achievement will obviously have been epochal. Not only Voegelin, but also
the other Walgreen lecturers and Niebuhr, made a
contribution which, as to both substance and style, it
would be extremely difficult to match today; and those
who are concerned with the future of this country
could do no better than to study their works.
Cl

Christmas Day 1779
Now that the memorable day
of Christ's birth shines, may sacred light be given
To illuminate my heart and guide the way
To gracious heaven.
Christ, grant your trembling servant ease!
May proper hope quiet my fearful reason!
Grant sure belief and hear this prayer for peace.
Dear Lord, in season.

Hope
Swift hours on swift hours flee;
Day hastens past quick day!
New light brings new hope: see
Success on oath today.
Thus, man's mocked. Random, cruel,
Twilight deludes the fool.

Wasting Time
The hours for pleasure flee; wary
Of time, mind blames ennui.
The hours still flee.

-The above prayers and meditations from the Latin
of Samuel johnson are translated by R. L. Barth
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The Christmas
Carols
Richard Lee
Almost all holidays in America
eventually become thanksgiving
days, and our Day of National
Thanksgiving, while delicious, now
only repeats the thanksgiving
theme given many other holidays.
The popular punditry interpreting
our holidays gradually claims them
all as days to count our blessings
and bless whatever has the good
sense to bless us. I suppose subverting most of our holidays into days
for counting our blessings should
be no surprise in a wealthy, conservative country where the civil
religion and popular culture celebrate a prosperous status quo, but
I think I detect a sharper edge on
our chronic holiday thanksgivings
at Christmas. At this time Americans also seem keen to celebrate
rather convulsive conversions of
the ungrateful into the generous,
misanthropes into philanthropes.
Probably nowhere is this Christmas preoccupation with conversions seen more clearly than in the
seasonal TV screenings of the
many film versions of Charles Dickens' A Christmas Carol and especially
Frank Capra's It's a Wonderful Life.*
What these Christmas carols do so
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delightfully, of course, is subject
their Bah-Humbugging heroes to a
harrowing and hallowing supernatural experience on Christmas
Eve which converts them to the
"Christmas spirit." These terrorizing and tantalizing conversions may
also help us make our own seasonal
conversions into the American holiday spirit, namely counting our
blessings and giving fresh, if now
misty-eyed, thanksgiving for them.
Dickens has the easier time of it
in his Christmas Eve conversion of
Ebenezer Scrooge, though he
nonetheless pulls out all the stops
in tormenting and tempting him
into charity. "As I hope to live to
be another man from what I was,"
Scrooge cries to the last Ghost, "I
am prepared to bear you company
with a thankful heart." In Victorian
melodrama one need only change a
crabbed and stingy master into a
glad and generous master for the
whole community to benefit, and
Dickens' Fezziwiggian presumption
in A Christmas Carol is that the
happy master is the good master.
While Scrooge is properly repelled by the appalling revelations
of the Ghosts, what he repents toward is merriment. It turns out
that what he needs to be good is
festivity, in short, a warm, Dickensian Christmas. The admonition of
*Wonderful Life is now ripe with age

(40 years old this year) and may
seem nearly as distant from the present generation as A Christmas Carol.
This may also be the last year TV
stations will screen Wonderful Life in
its original black and white version,
thus preserving its aura of the past
and its aesthetic integrity, for it is
among those unhappy film classics
undergoing computerized tinting
into color for contemporary TV audiences. My reactionary view is that
we should no more change the colors in a film than the adjectives in a
novel, but I admit the cause is lost.
Fellow reactionaries should put away
black and white videocassettes of
these film classics while there is still
time.

A Christmas Carol is: he keeps
Christmas best who returns to the
festivities of life to give thanks for
them with his own gifts.
The Capra carol takes on the
harder task of converting suicidal
George Bailey into seeing the graciousness of his life already heavily
weighted with charity for others,
and Capra thus achieves a deeper
vision of the "Christmas spirit"
than Dickens. When the angel Clarence horrifies George with visions
of the nightmare Bedford Falls
would have become had he not
lived there so dutifully, George
gladly rushes home on Christmas
Eve to take up his duties once
again, perhaps now adding an undeserved jail sentence for misappropriation of funds at his Savings
and Loan.
But Capra is too wise, and possibly too Christian, to leave us with
the cold comfort that the world
might be worse without us and we
should keep on keeping on.
Rather, he subjects George to a second, more evangelical conversion
in the arrival of all his neighbors to
give him the money he needs to
cover the lost (and stolen) Savings
and Loan deposit. The dutiful dogooder George is thus delivered
from his virtues and forced to see
that he is not made good or glad
by them but by the love of his
friends. The message of Wonderful
Life is: he keeps Christmas best
who returns to the duties of life to
give thanks for them-and discovers the blessings of life which precede its duties.
To discern the blessing which
precedes any counting of our blessings with any hearts readied to give
thanks at all, we should, of course,
need to turn to another, earlier
story. But A Christmas Carol and,
even better, Wonderful Life remain
deservedly
popular
conversion
stories for the American celebration of Christmas as another
thanksgiving holiday.
~~
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Socratic Method &
Music Performance
Linda Ferguson
For many of us who are devoted
to the traditional ideals of liberal
undergraduate education, the prevailing pedagogical model is the
Socratic method. Whether or not
the historical Socrates actually
taught by this method, and
whether or not the Platonic
dialogues actually proceed according to it, the "Socratic method"
generally implies an aggressive and
adversarial meeting of teacher and
student in which the student formulates a position on a question
raised by the teacher, and the
teacher challenges that position by
finding its weaknesses; once the
weaknesses are systematically revealed, the student remedies them
and presents a re-formulation for
further testing.
When the student's formulation
is sufficient to withstand the criticism of the teacher, that formulation is used in constructing a new
and more advanced formulation
about a more complex issue which
the teacher will introduce by ques-
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tioning when the student has demonstrated mastery of the simpler
one. This method is distinct from
the lecture and also from the discussion; sometimes it is called
"tutorial." (I resist here, although I
recognize, a cynical impulse to define "Socratic teaching" as a way of
tricking my student into thinking as
I do, or of forcing him, through
word games, to say that he does.)
It has occasionally occurred to
me, as I travel between the lecture
classroom and the private music
studio,
that
if "Socratic-style
dialogue" is to go on in teaching
these days, it might have a better
chance in the studio than in the
classroom. In a recent volume on
higher learning (Schooling and the
Acquisition of Knowledge), Richard C.
Anderson of the University of Illinois describes Socratic teaching as
the task of "[keeping] the student
working until he or she has constructed a framework that will
stand to criticism." At present this
matches the task of the practical
music teacher more exactly than it
describes the usual work of the
classroom lecturer.
Practical music-making (i.e. , performance) is not usually viewed as
a "liberal study" but as a "servile"
technical and specialized pursuit,
perpetuated through a series of
contacts between student and
teacher during which the student
learns to imitate the sounds the
teacher makes or to produce the
sounds the teacher describes. The
goal, usually vocational, is that the
student will master the sound-making operations in order to enact
them in public for others. (Insofar
as many "liberal arts" courses have
parallel practical goals, they are
also "servile," technical, and specialized.)
A performance of music is not
an argument in the discursive
sense, but it is the taking of a position. An excellent performance is
the utterance of a fully framed and

persuasive formulation about the
piece. The goal of the teaching is,
to recall Anderson, "to keep the
student working until he or she has
constructed a framework that will
stand to criticism"; in musical study
that translates "to prepare a performance worthy of an audience."
Although the content and purpose of practical music study differ
from the "liberal arts," the conditions which seem most likely to prevent "Socratic" teaching in the
classroom do not impede the private music lesson. In the studio, the
one-to-one teacher-student ratio,
otherwise found only in the most
advanced and specialized reading
and research courses, is the norm.
The music student makes a sustained utterance (i.e., a recitation)
and is then criticized systematically.
In the music lesson criticism takes
place in private; since the student
knows at the outset that criticism of
the performance will ensue, it is
not unusual and shocking, although it may still be painful. Obviously the student must actively prepare, else the lesson will have no
text.
The path of the lesson necessarily follows from what the student
has first posited in performance.
Quoting again from Anderson, "in
Socratic instruction it is the student
who forges the conceptual system.
The teacher is guided by an understanding of the accepted system
and continuously updated diagnoses of the current status of the
student's schema, but the teacher
does not 'lay on' the accepted
theory."
Occasionally
Imitation
("the laying on of accepted theory")
is the most efficient and effective
way to clarify a point in a lesson, to
move the instruction ahead to a
more interesting and complicated
question, just as occasionally lecturing is more efficient and effective
than questioning in a classroom.
But excellent teaching both in musical techniques and in interpreta-
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tion of scores involves more than
simple imitation, the studio's version of "regurgitation" of information.
Again, I do not claim that performance studies are generically
the same as liberal academic
studies, or that they are better.
Rather, I suggest that in looking
for ways to enliven classroom
teaching, perhaps we could transport something of the dynamic and
rigor of the private music lesson to
the lecture room or seminar. This
possibility first occurred to me last
summer, when Valparaiso University was host to two distinguished
guests. They came here under entirely differing circumstances and
to fulfill widely diverse missions.
One of the visitors was Marshall
Gregory of Butler University who
addressed a group of V. U. faculty
during a three-day workshop,
"Critical Thinking Across the Curriculum"; the other was John
Wustman, internationally acclaimed
pianist and vocal coach, who had
accepted the University's invitation
to locate his two-week masterclass
for singers and pianists on our
campus.
Gregory's lecture defined the obligation of teaching as cultivation of
the abilities to accept and respond
productively to criticism. He urged
that we examine students for their
ability to analyze, not to memorize;
that we abandon the lecture, which
promotes passivity; and that we
also abandon the "discussion"
method in which the teacher's goal
is merely to encourage participation, in favor of a pedagogy of critical dialogue: active formulation of
continuous reasoning by students,
subjected to constant criticism by
teachers.
Gregory acknowledged the difficulties of this pedagogical model,
especially in light of circumstances
imposed beyond the teacher's immediate control: large class size, recalcitrant students, demand for
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"objective" testing and grading, expectation that large amounts of
subject matter will be mastered in
the course, and pressure to divert
large amounts of the teacher's time
and energy to work other than
teaching.

In looking for ways to
enliven teaching, perhaps
we could transport
something of the dynamic
and rigor of the private
music lesson to the
lecture room or seminar.
Gregory's address was not especially well-received. In theory, the
method he advocated is hard to
fault, but it is even harder to practice. And the line of argument
seemed weakened by the fact that
he lectured for an hour on why lecturing is not an effective form of
teaching. But Gregory's aim had
not been to demonstrate good
teaching; rather he had come to
challenge us to think about what
good teaching should look like.
John Wustman, who had more
time to make his case, did not
spend a single of the sixty classroom hours in lecture, nor did he
ever speak about teaching. He provided a sustained demonstration of
what good teaching looks like.
Wustman does not claim to teach
by "a method." Yet frequently I
was
reminded
of
Gregory's
rhetoric, and the method he had
advocated, as when Wustman
would admonish a student to consult the text, or to reject simple
"canned" answers. "Look at the
score," he would urge. "I am testing your thought, not your memory!"
In response to a question about
the construction of a song, a student replies in a standard academic

code: "ABA" (meaning, "in three
sections, the first and third being
identical"). "ABA! What is that?
You remind me of school!"
Wustman
exclaims
scornfully,
though it is clearly useful to understand the ternary form as long as
that understanding is the means to
further thought rather than the
limit of it. Although Wustman
prides himself on not "being
academic," it is obvious that what
he means by "academic" is what
Jacques Barzun calls "Hokum" ("artificial apples of knowledge").
"Masterclass," a classroom form
of studio music lesson, signifies differently to different "masters."
Sometimes the masterclass is an opportunity for an aspiring young
performer to be discovered by a famous performer. The Pavarotti
masterclasses held several years ago
at the Julliard School (which were
accompanied by Mr. Wustman)
might be so described; the students
who appeared were carefully
screened, and the "classes" consisted of their polished performances, on national television.
The Wustman classes, although
conducted by a famous professional, are not of the showcase variety. No competition is held to
select the participants. The class is
advertised nationally and performers with sufficient time, money,
and confidence apply. Applicants
are accepted on a first-come, firstserve basis. Wustman limits the
number of participants to forty or
fifty to insure adequate attention to
each one, but he does not specify
any other requirements, and he accepts an unlimited number of auditors.
Simply, he takes each student's
"recitation," or performance, and
leads the student through the process of testing for weaknesses and of
reformulation. The method is the
same regardless of the level of expertise demonstrated. The classes
attract professionals, students, and
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amateurs from across the country.
Last summer the youngest participant was an 18-year-old college student from Canada; the oldest was a
retired teacher of singing from
Mississippi. Two were physicians;
one was a receptionist for a trucking company. Many were aspiring
young professional singers and
pianists, seeking to test and improve their performances (and
thereby, their chances for success
in their field); others were teachers
of music, seeking to do the same.
The classroom routine is established early. Each of the lessons-as
many as fifteen each day-follows
the same format. In the presence
of all members of the class, most of
whom are equipped with scores,
pencils, and tape recorders, a pair
of performers (singer and accompanist) present their hypothesis
about the song they have selected;
that is, they perform it. Wustman's
first response (nearly always some
version of "Well, it is going to be
very good!") is more often a promise than a compliment.
If the song has been sung in a
language other than English, the
singer then presents a translation,
prepared ahead of time. Published
translations, often provided in the
scores, may not be consulted, in
part because the teacher believes
them to be unreliable, and in part
because he requires that the student take full responsibility for partiCipation in the piece. (Marshall
Gregory would describe this as
"earning ownership of the ideas
raised by the text.")
Some interpretative comments
pertaining to the literary content of
the song may follow, or perhaps a
piece or two of historical information may be dispensed in passing.
The performance is begun again.
After the first phrase, the testing of
the
"hypothesis"
commences.
Causes, rather than effects, are
treated. "Legato," therefore, does
not mean "smooth," but rather it
December, 1986

means "bound, tied together, connected." "What is bound together?"
"Notes." "What binds the notes?"
"Sound." "What do you need to do
to make the sounds more connected?" And the line of questioning continues until the Wustman
catechism on "legato" has been discovered and articulated by the student.
Students who have attended the
classes before have the advantage
of having heard and practiced
some of the answers, and sometimes there is the sense that true
dialectic has given way to riddles
and trick questions. But some of
the questions that sound like riddles (such as "what is an eighth
note?") have a purpose which affects the way a passage is performed. (In the case of the eighth
note, Wustman argues that "two of
something is more than half of
something" and that an eighth note
must be thought of as the time of
two sixteenth notes, not as one-half
the time of a quarter note; his

point has to do with the need to
focus on continuing the sound
rather than on stopping it.)
When a student struggles to respond, but fails to connect with the
line of questioning, Wustman will
change directions. "Of the three or
four things I can think of to say
about that note, which one of them
do you want me to say?" asks an
exasperated young man. "That it is
the point at which the phrase turns
around," Wustman replies simply,
and lets both teacher and student
off the hook to get on with a more
interesting point.
Sometimes he allows awkward silences to intrude into the dialogue.
Either by accident or design these
silences demonstrate the need for
sounds to be "bound together," and
serve to illustrate what happens to
a line of singing that is not legato.
Other times, a question from the
floor may result in a brief, but orderly exposition on a point of general applicability (as in a spontaneous mini-lecture on the pronuncia-

Amen
With tenative probes and advances-like snow
that first feathers orchards, then stars on the window,
before it can thicken to one seamless curtain
connecting by dawn earth with heaven it comes.
Room by luminous room, building anthems from
brush of its hem against walls you've been watching
since waiting began.
Close now. So close, its Amen
fills space you'd reserved for, undressing, for letting
at last it take charge. And while snow outside lengthens,
it bends to assist, to lift you, well-robed now.
through storm's unrelenting hosannas.

Lois Reiner
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tion of the final "ch" sound in the
singing of German.)
One rule of the Wustman masterclass is that once a lesson has
been given on a particular song, no
other students may perform that
song in class. Besides assuring that
varied repertoire will be covered,
this policy encourages rapt attention to the treatment of "standard
repertoire" pieces presented in
class. The same lesson need not be
given to each student individually if
all students in the room are attentive to the one who is performing.
Having observed Wustman at
work both in the masterclass and in
the private lesson, I know that in
the private lesson he moves more
quickly, more by telling than by
asking, more by imitation than by
dialogue. There is a reason for this.
Two weeks of private lessons provide at most two hours of instruction; two weeks of Wustman masterclasses provide sixty hours, if the
observing students can sustain their
involvement in the line of questioning and in the subsequent "reformulations." One of the miracles of
the Wustman classes seems to be
that for the most part, they can.
Earlier, I speculated that the private music lesson may provide the
rare opportunity for true "tutorial"
teaching. Yet Wustman's success in
these classes seems to rely in part
on the presence of an "active" audience. The dynamic process between
student and teacher seems to
flourish in the more exciting context of "performance." Perhaps this
is because it is a performance art
that is being taught; perhaps it is
because Wustman is, besides being
a master teacher, a master entertainer; and perhaps it is because
the Socratic model of questioning
an individual in a classroom setting
is a good one after all.
The Wustman Masterclasses have
in recent years become something
of a legend among American singers and accompanists who specialize
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in vocal repertoire. Wustman holds
a professorship at the University of
Illinois, but is better known internationally for his recordings and
concertizing, especially as accompanist to tenor Luciano Pavarotti.
For two weeks each summer, he
"retires" from his other commitments to teach in a fashion not
practical in the usual workaday
life of teacher and student. For a
number of years, the classes were
held on the campus of Eureka
College in central Illinois. Desiring a change of setting, Wustman
was attracted to the Valparaiso
campus, a "retreat-like" atmosphere with few distractions
which is also relatively convenient for those who would travel
here: off the beaten path, but
not too far.
If all goes as expected, the
Wustman Masterclasses will return
to the Valparaiso campus next
June. They will provide once again
on our campus a highly successful
model of teaching. I can assert that
the model is successful because the
evidence can be heard. The feedback is immediate and available to
everyone present. Through a process of critical testing of ideas about
singing and playing a particular
song, we hear increasingly convincing "reformulations."
Last year, when Marshall Gregory challenged the faculty to undertake radical and united reform
of our pedagogical methods, his argument sounded like a song I had
heard too many times before. In
Wustman's practical application of
Gregory's theory, it showed some
new promise. Gregory warns that if
we are unwilling to reform our
teaching, we must make peace with
the alternative: to do the best we
can, given the intellectual passivity
of our students. John Wustman's
teaching does not settle for that alternative. His presence on this campus should inspire us not to settle
for it either.
Cl

Hard Choices
Albert R. Trost
Nuclear weapons issues are not
very prominent on our campus.
This is not for want of effort by
some of our faculty. I think it is
fair to say that among the faculty
there are several who might be
characterized as anti-nuclear activists. Colleagues in such diverse
departments as English, Philosophy, and Theology have offered
courses on nuclear weapons and
war topics.
Some of the same faculty and a
few students sponsored a visit two
years ago by the Australian anti-nuclear activist, Dr. Helen Caldicott.
That event drew about six hundred
people, a very large number for a
public event on our campus. Her
emotional commitment to the cause
of a nuclear freeze, followed by disarmament, was contagious, and she
carried the crowd along, for the
most part. Yet eighteen months
later there is little evidence that she
was ever on the campus. There is
no more debate on the question
than there was before she arrived,
and there is certainly no anti-nuclear movement.
This semester I had my "go" at
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the subject, believing in a spirit of
true professional chauvinism that
political scientists had formulated
the most reasoned debate about the
nuclear question and therefore that
ours was the proper discipline to
consider the issue. I have devoted
at least one-third of the current
semester in an International Relations course to a consideration of
nuclear weapons, deterrence, and
nuclear war. One of three required
texts is also devoted to the subject.
When one of the best students in
the class and one of the most socially committed came forward to
tell me after four weeks that this
was too much, I realized that I too
had failed to ignite a consuming
fire of interest in the topic. I had
failed to shock or stimulate my students. After several weeks they
were saturated and did not want to
pursue the topic further.
Valparaiso University is typical of
most American campuses on this
issue as well as being fairl y typical
of American public opinion in general. The vast maJority of people
are agreed that nuclear war is horrible and must be avoided. They
are willing to say this to a public
opinion pollster, or possibly on a
referendum proposition to create a
nuclear-free zone on their campus
or in their city.
Beyond this few are willing to go,
either in study and debate or in
political commitment. The nuclear
freeze movement has never caught
on in our country as it has in Europe. In the United States, protests
on nuclear policy tend to be wellorganized, but small. The debate
and the political activity are almost
entirely an elite phenomenon, engaged in by some professors, medical doctors, and researchers, and
especially by many clergy from the
mainline religious bodies. In fact, if
there is a clear opposition to national policy on nuclear weapons it
comes not from the Democratic
Party, but from within some of the
December, 1986

mainline churches.
Because public opinion on nuclear issues is so uninformed and
uninterested, it is easily manipulated. President Reagan was able
within a few days after Reykjavik to
turn what had been vague sentiment for an arms control agreement and disappointment at it not
being achieved at the summit into a
ringing
endorsement
of
his
Strategic Defense Initiative. He
managed to accomplish this by
framing SDI in simple terms, as reliable protection against a nuclear
attack. Who could be against this?
Few cared to pursue the relation of
SDI to other aspects of the arms
control agenda, to our current
strategy of deterrence, or to prospects for an arms race.

If there is a clear
opposition to national
policy on nuclear weapons
it comes not from the
Democratic Party, but
from within some of the
mainline churches.
Imminence is one key to arousing a public on nuclear weapons issues. European publics are more
easily aroused than ours because
the possibility of nuclear war intheir countries seems more of an
immediate threat. New missiles are
going in on their soil. Furthermore,
in most of the scenarios for nuclear
war, the weapons will be flying
over and detonating in their air
space. The one tangible border between East and West is in Europe,
most particularly in Germany. The
students in a classroom in Valparaiso, or anywhere else in North
America, cannot visualize nuclear
possibilities with the same immediacy. In fact, the discussion of nuclear war in our country seems un-

real and hypothetical.
Simplicity is also essential for the
arousal of interest in this topic. If
one makes the avoidance of nuclear
war the only goal of our national
security policy, and if one begins
the discussion with pictures of the
devastation at Hiroshima in 1945,
or sees the recent films Threads and
The Day After, or maybe something
popular like War Games, and ends
up listening to Carl Sagan describe
a "nuclear winter," it is a direct and
easy route to the position that nuclear weapons are "obscene." And
if they are obscene, then they must
be disposed of, even if this means
acting unilaterally.
To simplify the choice to
Hiroshima in 1945 or Valparaiso in
1986 is to offer death or life. One
does not have to be led to make
this choice. For some people, even
intellectuals and professionals, the
choice may genuinely be this simple, and therefore no choice at all.
It is not likely to be the position of
people with governmental authority, especially those with positions in
the governments of the five nuclear
powers.
Almost everyone can agree that
nuclear war should be avoided, and
almost everyone will agree that that
should be a high priority of our
foreign and defense policy. However, there are other high-priority
objectives that cannot be lost sight
of. The defense of the borders of
the United States against both a
nuclear attack and a conventional
invasion is an obligation every admimstration must attend to. Since
the NATO Treaty in 1949, our
government has also included the
defense of Western Europe and
Canada as a high-order objective,
although it must be admitted that
there are significant numbers of
Europeans who no longer see an
American role so clearly. The Russians probably follow the mirror set
of these priorities, though they may
weight them differently.
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The difficult and complicated
problem for us and the Russians is
to provide for defense while at the
same time avoiding nuclear war,
given the fact that both sides have
large
inventories
of
nuclear
weapons and see one another as
the major rival in international
politics. What the national leadership of the major powers face is a
choice of several strategies or
policies, none of which completely
insures that they will be able to
realize all of their priorities. Their
choices are not as simple as life vs.
death. They have an obligation to
work out the varied and complex
implications of their choices as
carefully as they can.
There is certainly no lack of literature on nuclear weapons questions
to help policy makers and some of
the rest of us understand the dilemmas and the choices available.
This literature requires time and
effort to master, and it may not result in unambiguous answers. The
areas of nuclear weapons, strategy,
war, and arms control have been
among the most fully and systematically argued in a variety of disciplines. This is clearly true of the
political science contribution. If
ethical questions are more the province of theology and philosophy,
and weapons and their physical
effects the province of the sciences
and engineering, the strategic
discussion has been mainly carried
on in political science, more
specifically international relations.
I have found that for even a
basic lay understanding of strategic
and policy questions in this area at
least three weeks of class time and
about twenty hours of reading are
required. One must first of all
master the technical jargon, at least
to the point of understanding the
two dozen or so basic concepts.
Careful reading of some essential
theoretical
literature
is
also
necessary. In addition, one has to
know the history of American-
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Soviet relations, the historical
development of nuclear strategy in
both the United States and the
Soviet Union, the state of the
respective nuclear arsenals, and the
national security policy-making
process and the policy that results
from it.

There are many who are
active in the various
nuclear policy movements
who have not taken the
time to become familiar
with the strategic
dimensions of the issue.
Even this basic understanding is
not very widespread in the population, though one hopes it reaches
the top policy-making levels. There
are many who are active in the
various nuclear policy movements
who have not taken the time to become familiar with the strategic dimensions of the issue. They may
sense that the clarity and simplicity
with which they view the issues may
be compromised by a jaunt
through this literature. For instance, it provides almost no support for the positions of either unilateral nuclear disarmament or nuclear superiority. Even nuclear
freeze does not find much support
in the literature. The distances between real options narrow and
blur.
The choices become more complex and ambiguous in the area of
strategy because the avoidance of
nuclear war is only one priority for
policy-makers. Defense of the nation is another, as is defense of allies. In addition, all the national
security priorities must be considered, at least on the American
side, in terms of what is politically
possible given our pluralistic and
democratic system of decision-making.

The strategic option that both
the United States and the Soviet
Union have chosen since the early
1950s is that of nuclear deterrence.
This option has allowed them to
realize all of their major priorities
for thirty years. They have avoided
nuclear war and successfully prevented encroachment on their respective territories and that of their
formal allies. The strategy of deterrence paradoxically threatens
nuclear retaliation against a nuclear
attacker. The object is to avoid ever
having to use nuclear weapons by
threatening to use them. It is easy
to see that for those who see nuclear weapons as obscene, this strategy is unpalatable. Our strategy of
deterrence, it should be noted,
threatens retaliation not only
against a · nuclear attacker but also
against a massive conventional attack on our allies in Europe.
According to the prevailing strategy of deterrence, the threatened
retaliation must be both credible
and stable to be effective. Credibility means simply that whatever
threat is proposed, it must be believed by the adversary. The credibility of a deterrent, for example, is
increased if it is invulnerable to a
pre-emptive strike by an adversary.
An enemy must believe that you
have the will to use your retaliatory
weapon. It cannot be so big and
horrible that it threatens the destruction of oneself as well as the
other side.
Stability is a more elusive requirement. Roughly it means preserving a balance of threats between potential adversaries. It implies that whatever is threatened as
a retaliation must not be so
threatening that the rival sees an
advantage in a pre-emptive strike
before your threatening weapons
can be used. Stability is maintained
if the adversary does not engage in
an arms race to try to counter the
threat of the retaliation.
To make matters even more difThe Cresset

ficult, stability and credibility are
frequently incompatible objectives.
They must be traded off against
one another, making for a less than
perfect deterrent. For instance, a
small nuclear weapon like the neutron bomb is very credible because
it is easy to believe it will be used
since it would not compromise the
safety of the user. On the other
hand, it is very unstable. It is so
small that the United States might
be tempted to use it in a conventional war as a defensive weapon
rather than holding it back as a deterrent. It would cross the nuclear
threshold and make escalation
easier for both sides. To take
another
example,
submarinelaunched ballistic missiles are credible because submarines are easily
concealed and hence invulnerable.
However, they are so threatening
that the adversary is encouraged to
discover the technology to locate
the submarines, prompting a renewed arms race.
The Strategic Defense Initiative
must also be seen and evaluated in
light of the requirements of a strategy of deterrence. It is not the obvious choice, from the standpoint
of deterrence, that President
Reagan has presented. In the atmosphere of the talks in Iceland,
he made it seem as if SDI would
preclude the need for offensive nuclear weapons and therefore eliminate the threat of nuclear attack.
At the end of its development, SDI
would be effective against any offensive nuclear weapon. Only a
fool, it would seem, would not be
attracted to this prospect.
However, the road through research and development of SDI is
laden with lack of credibility and
stability. Right now, the technology
required is hardly credible. All aspects of the system seem highly
vulnerable to pre-emptive attack,
even when the system is completed.
To the extent that it might work,
there is every incentive for the
December, 1986

Soviet Union to strike before it is in
place. And this is not the only
threat to stability. The Soviet
Union will be encouraged to research counters to the system, provoking a massive and expensive
arms race.
Though SDI's trillion dollar price
tag should provoke more debate
about alternatives and strategic
considerations, the opposite appears to be happening after the
Iceland summit. The attraction of
the simple solution offered by the
President was too much of a temptation for many in Congress, as
well as for a large majority of the
public. The President's promise of
total security from a nuclear attack,
however shaky its premises, seemed
preferable to the threat and ambiguities present strategies present.
The swamp of ambiguity to
which one succumbs by reading the
literature of strategic theory cannot
be better illustrated than by the position on nuclear arms adopted by
the American Catholic bishops in
1983. As one might expect from
spokespersons of the mainline
Christian churches, they exercised
their "preference for life" by explicitly saying that the use of nuclear weapons cannot be justified.

However, in preparing their statement they and their staffs had
gone through the strategic literature with some thoroughness, so
they felt obligated to recognize the
need for a deterrent nuclear force.
Yet, according to their statement,
this would be a deterrent force
whose actual use in a retaliatory
strike could never be justified. Such
a deterrent, of course, would be
the ultimate in non-credibility.
A more consistent statement on
the bishop's part would have omitted any reference to the need for a
deterrent. To do so, however,
would have been to ignore the nation's need for national security
and thus not to be intellectually responsive to the strategic literature
(and the strategic realities).
The way to progress on nuclear
arms policy is not clear. Anxiety
over the possible use of nuclear
weapons is high, but any government has a duty to defend the nation as well as to avoid nuclear war,
and nuclear weapons are now a
given in that defense. The path of
wisdom in the nuclear age is not to
wish the weapons away but to attend carefully to the thinking that
has gone on for thirty years on
how to avoid their use.
Cl
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Review Essay

A Grave Grace
Warren Rubel

Gravity and Grace:
Reflections and
Provocations
By Joseph Sittler. Minneapolis:
Augsburg. 127 pp. $6.95.
This slight but weighty book can
be tasted, swallowed, and, to alter
slightly Francis Bacon's maxim,
chewed and digested like a
nourishing bagel. Or to put the
perspective another way, if books
are "speculative instruments," then
Joseph Sittler's Gravity and Grace offers the reader at least a double delight: we get the long telescopic
view of the sage and we get the
microscopic view of the occasionally
irate senex or old man.
As Martin E. Marty points out in
his helpful foreword, the book can
be read through from beginning to
end because a number of sustaining themes give it its own coherence and direction. Yet we can
read and reread isolated paragraphs because Sittler discrimi-
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nately loves the world, he cares for
language, and he works for the
precise word. He does these things
well because he has a center and he
works out from that center.
In the collaboration that led to
the book's publication, editor
Linda-Marie DeHoff has arranged
the various sustaining themes in
what I took to be a kind of ascending and descending curve: we
begin with nature and grace in a
world, Sittler reminds us, that has
been around much longer than we
have, a world much larger than we
believed it to be just a generation
ago. We move into that world with
the fresh trust and risk of faith. We
proceed to the grainier problems
that shaped Sittler's own sense of
vocation in life-ministry, theology,
education, and language, to mention a few. We then curve downward to modern culture, to moral
discourse in a nuclear age, and, finally, to aging itself, to "a summing
up and a letting go."
The integrating element in these
themes is the kind of selfhood that
gradually comes clear to the
reader. Grace and gravity penetrate
and interpenetrate in Sittler's vision
of the self both being found and
finding: self to the world, self to
others-a connectedness affirmed
in Christian theology, brought to
realization in our understanding of
what it means to be a human being,
"the essence or core of likeness that
permits language and intelligibility,
even if we have no language in
common," because what we are and
what we may become are founded
and funded by Grace.
This sense of inner connectedness leads Sittler to some powerful
claims about the ingredients and
exigencies of Christian life and testimony in the contemporary world.
Strongly opposed to static appeals
to authority about the Word of
God, Sittler writes:
The authority of scriptural words

and passages is internal, not external, and it is not automatic. The
authority of scripture has to depend on the text's internal congruity with the human pathos: the
reality of what it means to be a
human being in this appalling
time. The pathos, confusion, ambiguity, and scatteredness of lifethis is the situation to which we
must address the biblical Word.
And that Word will be invested
with authority by virtue of its
Liberating, enlightening, and promising congruity, not by virtue of
"the Bible says." For most people,
what "the Bible says" is no more
authoritative than what the New
York Times or the Washington Post
says. The authority must be uncovered as intrinsic.
I quote the paragraph in full because it discloses the kind of constructive theology the author works
from and toward and because the
paragraph gives us a basic orientation or grounding in the range of
Sittler's concerns as speaker and
writer. Because the Word of God
has possessed him and because he
continues to seek to possess that
Word in his own evolving selfhood,
he connects as human being
"soaked in scripture" with both the
seemingly trivial-attending a New
York Yankee baseball game with
Franklin Clark Fry, who puns on a
Luis Aparicio error-and the crucial issues of our day-from ecology to the compelling interrelatedness of Christian love with justice.
We find a second kind of delight
in attending to this work. "Green
grapes gripe, and young men are
not ripe," goes an old Russian
proverb. Neither green in his age
nor a griper, Sittler combines "reflections with provocations," as the
subtitle of the book suggests. There
is a wise, even crotchety testiness to
his provocations.
Sensitive to the gaps between
what we are and what we should
be, Sittler sends out those verbal
barbs that sting us into consciousness about the disturbing incongruities in our culture and in ourThe Cresset

selves. But because he himself recognizes that our "interior life goes
round and round and round, with
deepening ambiguities," we do not
feel that Sittler stands outside of
our human predicament. Thus, he
can speak of both the mind's need
for order and the comic extremities
of the aunt who saved boxes to
contain all things that women can
save: she even had a box labeled
"pieces of string too short to save."
And even if he turns on the complacent within our common establishments, one listens carefully because Sittler has developed a kind
of impersonal self-transcendence
which redeems the very predicament he isolates and chastises.
There is, consequently, a kind of
poignancy in his watching with awe
the first man landing on the moon
while his teenage son never drops
his feet from the table and quips to
his father, "Don't worry, Pop,
they'll make it."
Or he can turn on academia:
"college faculty should be educated
persons. This is often not the case.
Many are trained-not educated.
You can train dogs to jump, and
you can train people to report what
is going on in chemistry and transmit that information. But education
means training the mind to unfold
the multiple facets of human existence with some appreciation, eagerness, and joy. It is, in essence, the
opposite of being dull. We've got
plenty of trained, dull people on
our own faculties, but not many
educated people."
Or Sittler can turn on the contemporary church and congregation: "Much of the intellectual and
aesthetic life within the contemporary congregation is simply contemptible. The intellectual content
of the ordinary sermon is contemptible. It is often full of moral
fervor and piety, but it is usually
absent in the clarity of ideas that
thread against the accepted norms
and offer new possibilities for reDecember, 1986

flection."
I touch on these separate judgments both because they may strike
home and because the context of
these quotes-a teenage son more
at home in a technological culture
than his father, an indictment
against academic dullness after a
portrayal of a college teacher of literature who excited football players, a contemporary Christian
church placed against the vigorous
intellectual and artistic life of the
early church-suggests how inclusive Sittler's perspective can be. He
cauterizes to heal.
The final delight in reading this
little book nests in a special
paradox. Although Sittler is at his
best when he argues against the
turn toward subjectivity of our age,
when he places before us the "timeless, high impersonality" of the
church as an ancient and lively
worshipping community held together by God's initiative for us
and toward us in Jesus Christ, he is
the kind of person one points to as
a human being both full of faith
and faithful.
No easy mortality and no easy
immortality here. Rather a pilgrim
in whom mind and spirit meet,
who sees in nature the love of God,

in history the grace of God, in his
own life the mystery of the love
and grace of God at work. His life
may be curving downward to
death. He has learned about letting
go, one gathers, because he knows
how preciously one seeks to grasp
the fullness of life in the flickering
and flaming light of human conSCiousness.
I first read selected Sittler works
many years ago. I first heard him
preach about thirty years agQ--{)n
love and regard for the earth. Subsequently, as he has aged and as I
have heard him quote from memory large swatches of Wallace
Stevens' poetry or speak about
Christ as Pantocrator in a Byzantine Church in Asia Minor that he
visited, I want almost to claim that
I have seen about him the sacred
penumbra that some believed they
saw hovering around Bishop
Joseph Butler toward the end of
his life.
It does not matter. In this little
book peace and restlessness anneal.
It is the kind of book one recommends just because it is unpretentious, wise, and, yes, warm with the
things of the spirit. One can keep
and guard it and then regard it
Cl
again.

The Note
Before leaving I write a sloppy mother note,
the electrician repaired the hall light, and I
made you a cake, slightly lopsided:
almost level, almost round
like a beginning potter's bowl. Eat.
Frosting will stick to your lips, crumbs
will fall on your lap, a chunk escape
to the floor. And if the cat continues to jump
at the drapery cord, be glad.
Chaos gives order meaning, a woman
comes alive:
her heart swings like a smokey redbird,
everything in a momentary disarray,
everything sweet to the lips.

Pat James
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Woe to You,
Dear Doctors
Dot Nuechterlein
Doesn't it just frost you? Well,
maybe it doesn't; maybe this is a
local problem that does not appear
in your community, but somehow I
doubt it.
I refer to the loathsome, insensitive, abominably arrogant practice
of many doctors, dentists, hospitals,
and other assorted medico-types
who keep their patients and clients
sitting in "waiting" rooms forever
before the great ones deign to
show themselves and tend to business.
Once upon a time I patronized a
physician who gave individual appointments to each individual patient and never kept anyone waiting more than fifteen minutes. On
those occasions when he had an
emergency or an unplanned baby
delivery or was just running late in
the office, his receptionist would
call and offer to reschedule the
time.
Wow, I have come to learn, was
he ever a rarity. Many of the current crop seem to give a whole platoon of people the same appointment time; it is really quite a fair
system, I suppose, because everyone
sits. Even the first person in the
door, first thing in the morning, is
likely to face a period of solemn
contemplation or a run-through of
tired old magazines.
Why do we put up with it? Why
don't we complain a little, or
scream and holler a lot? Why do
we pay them all that money and
then let them squander so much of
our time without a peep of protest?
We gripe about it to one another a
great deal, judging by the con versa-
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tions I hear regularly, but what
good does that do if we don't get
the message across to those in
charge?
I'll tell you why we don't: good
old-fashioned fear. These people
hold either our lives .or our comforts in their hands, and we are afraid that if we displease them by
expressing our own displeasure
with them, they will either kick us
out or make us miserable.
We would then have to go
through the tedious process of
finding someone else who is accepting new patients-not an easy
task-not to mention the horrendous business of filling out those
thousands of questions on new
medical history forms and repeating the stories of our painful pasts
and the variety of ailments of family members to the third and
fourth generation backwards; and
then it might turn out that the new
guy is no better than the old one.
Ah, friends and neighbors, they've
got us cold.
Lest you think that I am anti-doc
let me hasten to assure you that I
am not. Most of the members of
the health care professions that I
have met over the years have been
caring,
competent
men
and
women-and the few who weren't I
quit seeing quickly. But they seem
as a whole to have no conception of
how the rest of us live.
We may not make life and death
decisions by the day or play a role
in turning others' sorrows into joys,
but many of us feel that we do
some valuable things with the
hours allotted us, and it is annoying to be given to understand that
obviously our time has no comparable worth.
It would not be a terrible problem if it happened only now and
then. No one has total control over
time, and anyone's timetable can go
astray, even the most highly placed
professional's. But the whole thing
has become so systematic, so to-be-

expected, that the day is long overdue to speak out. If we don't enjoy
twiddling our thumbs in the outer
office or clutching the drapes while
we sit nudely in the inner sanctum,
we have to let them know it.
How do doctors and dentists and
chiropractors and the rest of the
privileged few treat one another
when they serve each other's needs,
I wonder. Do they spend similar
hours staring at a compeer's blank
walls? Pardon my skepticism, but I
seem to find that hard to believe.
That would couple pretension with
not very high level intelligence. No,
I suspect that this unhappy treatment is reserved for us common
folk.
What to do about it? I am not a
revolutionary
rabble-rouser
by
either nature or nurture (although
to be truthful, I did once upon a
time organize and lead a strike. No
joke! Our local TV station cancelled Sesame Street, and I convinced a
number of mothers to join me in
having our toddlers and preschoolers picket the place, waving signs
with messages like "Bring Back Big
Bird," and "CKWS-TV Unfair to
Kids." It was wonderful-! had
alerted the city paper in advance,
and news items and photos ran in
media thousands of miles away.
Need I add that the program was
back on the air the following
week?); but I certainly agree with
the philosophy that there is power
in numbers, and if enough of us
protest at once, our chances are
better that someone may hear.
Ladies and gentlemen, I leave it
to you. You have my permission to,
as the advice columnists say, "show
this column to your doctor." And if
there be any in this small readership who themselves perpetrate this
shameful practice, oh, kind sirs and
ladies, do please mend your ways,
lest you find yourselves at the
mercy of an aroused and irate public. One shudders to think what
fate may lie in store for you then.
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